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I. INTRODUCTION
The application of economics to law makes many people uncomfortable.
The principal reason is that sooner or later-generally sooner-the
discussion must turn to efficiency. Efficiency has a business-industrial-not
treating-people-as-human-beings ring to it. This discomfort is well-founded.
Efficiency-based legal standards focus on the expectations of relatively
acquisitive people that their choices will make them feel or be "better off."'
* Stephen C. O'Connell Chair and Professor of Law, the University of Florida College of Law.
Len Riskin, Amy Mashbum, and Sarah Harrison made valuable contributions to this article for
which the author is grateful.
1. This is fundamentally the framework of the "wealth maximization" standard-based on
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As it turns out, these decision makers2 are often "wrong.",3 An enormous
amount of recent research on the determinants of actual happiness,4 as
opposed to expectations, may hold great potential for filling the gap and
moving the economic analysis of law to a more useful stage-one in which
efficiency is directly connected to how people actually feel.
This Article explores this promising advance. It concludes that direct
focus on one concept or another of happiness or "better-off-ness" 5 does not
fully address the limitations of law and economics and may raise additional
issues. For example, Which is more important, feeling better off or being
better off? When does happiness count? Is it at the time of the activity or as
one remembers it? The Article explains why outcome-oriented goals like
efficiency, happiness, or well-being are ultimately of limited use as goals for
law. It then makes the case that law would be more usefully applied to the
process of decision making. To this end, it examines the extent to which
law can be devoted to a decision-making ideal or "decisional equity."
The discussion has five parts. Part II places happiness research in the
context of past efforts to assess efficiency standards. Part III outlines the
schism between efficiency and happiness and examines whether they can be
choices made by people able to express themselves in markets. See infra text accompanying notes
34-38.
2. Much of the discussion about how to react to "wrong" choices addresses the possible
paternalism of limiting options available as opposed to the mechanics of decision making itself. See,
e.g., Colin Camerer et. al, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
"Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1231-35 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
3. Well-being can be assessed both subjectively and objectively. In this Article, well-being will
be used to denote an objective assessment.
4. See generally ROBERT FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE
QUEST FOR STATUS (1985); BRING S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS: HOW
THE ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT WELL-BEING (2002); DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON
HAPPINESS (2006); JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN
ANCIENT WISDOM (2006); JENNIFER MICHAEL HECHT, THE HAPPINESS MYTH: WHY WHAT WE
THINK Is RIGHT IS WRONG (2007); RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE
(2005); MATrHIEU RICARD, HAPPINESS: A GUIDE TO DEVELOPING LIFE'S MOST IMPORTANT SKILL
(Jesse Browner trans., Little, Brown & Co. 2006); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Emotions: The
Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L. J. 155 (2005); Richard A. Easterlin, Explaining
Happiness, 100 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 11176 (2003) [hereinafter Easterlin, Explaining
Happiness]; Richard A. Easterlin, Income and Happiness: Toward a Unified Theory, 111 ECON. J.
465 (2001) [hereinafter Easterlin, Income and Happiness]; Richard A. Easterlin, Will Raising the
Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All?, 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 35 (1995) [hereinafter
Easterlin, Happiness of All]; INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster & John E.
Roemer eds., 1991); Tiffany A. Ito & John T. Cacioppo, The Psychophysiology of Utility Appraisals,
in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 470 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1999); Richard E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of Happiness:
Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 527 (2003). For an excellent
selection of readings, see WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra.
5. In this Article, "utility" and "happiness" are used to note the sense of being better off. In
other words, they are subjective. "Welfare" and "well-being" are used to indicate relatively
objective standards like health and nutrition.
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reconciled. In addition, problems relative to legal analysis that are shared by
both efficiency and happiness standards are explored. Part IV discusses the
problems of relying on direct measures of happiness. The concept of
decisional equity is described and examined in Part V. It argues that
decisional equity means adhering, as much as is practical, to three rules in
order to achieve three ideals:
1. The Information Ideal: Individual decision making should take
place in the context of the most relevant information that can be
practically made available.
2. The Psychic Ideal: Decisions should be relatively unaffected by
desire and cognitive biases.
3. The Social Ideal: Decisions should not be influenced by adaptations
to perceived injustice.
The potential for law to achieve these ends is discussed. Although the
informational ideal is relatively easy to approach, the psychic and social
ideals may lie beyond the reach of traditional legal measures.
II. BEGINNING POINTS
The adverse reaction many people have to the use of economics to guide
law stems from a number of factors but ultimately can be distilled to four.
First, the link between efficiency itself and any normatively defensible
objective is weak. This issue was discussed extensively in the 1980s 6 and
will not be considered here except as it pertains to the history of efficiency7
and to specific issues that separate efficiency and happiness.
8
Second, conventional economics is based on behavioral assumptions
that have over the last twenty-five years come under increasing scrutiny.9
Principal among these assumptions is that people are rational and motivated
by self-interest alone. l These assumptions are, as it turns out, difficult to
6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). Possibly the most succinct
explanation of the separation between wealth maximization and morally defensible outcomes is
Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEoAL. STUD. 227
(1980). See infra text accompanying notes 44-45.
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. The law and economics movement began with the publication of Ronald Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960) and was propelled to the forefront by Richard Posner's
casebook, Economic Analysis of Law, which was first published in 1973 and is based on behavioral
assumptions and efficiency standards. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th
ed. 2007).
10. In one early law and economics offering, the author notes that rational self-interest means
square with actual behavior." More importantly, these behavioral
assumptions are particularly questionable when specifically applied to the
"markets" with which law and economics is concerned. The "goods" bought
and sold in the quasi-markets of law and economics-contract breach, levels
of care, criminal activity-are profoundly different from, say, buying a ton
of soy beans. In these markets, contract rights, carelessness, and criminal
behavior are viewed as subject to demand and supply. They are colored by
personal preferences and values related to fairness and a sense of obligation.
These matters are not a central concern of this Article except to illustrate that
a focus on happiness does not mean escaping the problems these
assumptions give rise to.
Third, efficiency is predicated on the accuracy of the choices people
make. 12 This deals with the narrow process of making choices. Standard
economic analysis assumes that preferences and choices match-indeed, that
choices reveal preferences. The logic goes that self-interested people reveal
their preferences by virtue of the choices they make. The reasoning here is
circular, however. Moreover, empirical evidence dealing with behavioral
economics from the last twenty-five years demonstrates that the choices
often turn out to be "wrong" as a result of various biases. "Bounded
rationality"'3 results in default tendencies that are inconsistent with
aspirations.14 These default tendencies are quirks of perceptions and decision
making that separate what a person desires from what is selected. In this
instance, "wrong" means that what is selected is not consistent with the
preference.
excluding "[s]omeone who acts from duty and obeys the law out of respect." Robert Cooter, Prices
and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1527 n.9 (1984).
11. A classic article on this is Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 328 (1977). For a strong argument that
not enough attention has been afforded the role of emotions in decision making, see Jon Elster,
Emotions and Economic Theory, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 47 (1998). In fact, there is evidence that
rationality and emotions are linked in important ways. See ANTONIO DAMASIO, DECARTES' ERROR:
EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (1994).
12. To some extent, the rationality assumption may properly be viewed as part of this general
area of study.
13. The term originated with Herbert Simon. See Herbert Simon, Rational Choice and the
Structure of the Environment, in ECONOMICS, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND THE COGNITIVE
REVOLUTION (Massimo Egidi & Robin Marris eds., 1992); HERBERT SIMON, Rationality and
Administrative Decision Making, in MODELS OF MAN, SOCIAL AND RATIONAL: MATHEMATICAL
ESSAYS ON RATIONAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL SETTING 196, 198-99 (1987). As the term
suggests, most decisions are made without complete information and thus the ability to accurately
predict outcomes. For a discussion in the context of contract law, see Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206
(2003).
14. See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 199 (2006).
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More attention will be afforded behavioral economics and decision
biases but only in the sense of how they might be addressed to achieve
decisional equity.' 5  These are, however, enormously important topics
because they address the link between policies, the laws created to advance
those policies, and actual individual choice making.1 6 No policy (or rules
promoting that policy) can be effective without consistent individual
choices. Since the 1980s, a huge body of economic research--drawing on
psychology 17 and biology 18-has been devoted to understanding the process
of choice making and ways this may affect the law.19 Thus, the incorporation
of behavioral theories began in law and economics. It would be misleading
to say that it has had a marked influence on mainstream law and economics
thinkers. Still, it is possible that this trend will continue. 20
15. See infra Part V.B.
16. See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Socioeconomics: Choices and Challenges, 41 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 257, 257-61 (2004); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 412-19; see also Colin F. Camerer, Wanting, Liking, and Learning:
Neuroscience and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 87 (2006).
17. More specifically "hedonic psychology." See WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 4.
18. See, e.g., Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 16.
19. The number of articles in law alone that address the implications of behavioral economics is
vast and often repetitive. One of the earliest is Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism and Market
Illusions, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309 (1986). See also Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of
Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008); Blumenthal, supra note 4; Jeremy Blumenthal,
Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Grant M. Hayden & Stephen Ellis, Law
and Economics After Behavioral Economics, 55 KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007); Christine Jolls,
Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1656 (1998);
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russel B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051
(2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and
Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002).
Perhaps the most recent publication to generate significant discussion about how law can account for
behavioral economics is Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 2. See also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The
Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003); Richard H. Thaler
& Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003); Symposium,
Preferences and Rational Choice: New Perspectives and Legal Implications, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 707
(2003); Symposium, Homo Economics, Homo Myopicus, and the Law of Economics of Consumer
Choice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2006).
20. This is not to say that those who write about conventional economics have jumped on the
behavioral bandwagon. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 6. Judge Posner also addresses the issue in
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551
(1998). The reluctance by some to "engage" in behavioral economics is understandable if one
considers the division within legal education more generally. There are those who are well-versed in
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The fourth aspect of efficiency that needs to be addressed is the
disconnect between choices made and how people feel about outcomes. In
other words, even if people are not subject to "bounded rationality" and even
if they are self-interested and make exactly the "right" choice, that choice
often turns out not to "deliver" in terms of happiness.2 More technically,
even if individuals accurately reveal preferences through their choices, they
may still not achieve the sought-after outcome in terms of its psychic impact.
The principal focus of this Article is on this newest area of study-
happiness research.22 The question is whether a direct focus on individual or
collective happiness can cure the problems of law and economics or even act
as a substitute. This is an odd question in some respects because some of the
versions of efficiency can be equated with happiness. For example, utility
maximization can be said to mean maximizing overall happiness. Still, as
will become clear, the focus on happiness has added important elements to
the analysis. The principal one is that modem research on happiness focuses
on actual or experienced happiness while the economist's notion of utility
involves expected or predicted happiness. In fact, happiness research has
progressed sufficiently that some economists are proposing that national
well-being accounts are as relevant as gross domestic product as a means of
guiding policy.23  The goal is to assess how people actually feel.24  The
question then becomes whether an approach of this nature can reshape
economic analysis as applied to law.25  Additionally, if happiness research
cannot cure the ills of law and economics or act as a replacement, Is there
economics, but for the most part, these are also people who, like Judge Posner, prefer to put
behavioral theories aside for one reason or another. The second group of scholars are those who for
one reason or another are not interested in economics in the first place, either because they find the
discipline threatening or because they find the free-market brand of economics that has characterized
law and economics scholarship politically uncomfortable.
21. For a brief but insightful discussion of problems inherent in decision making, see Jeremy
Blumenthal, supra note 4, at 157-59.
22. See authorities cited supra note 4.
23. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Toward National Well-Being Accounts, 94 AM. ECON.
REv. (PAPERS & PROC.) 429 (2004) (proposing to weigh the time spent in various activities by the
satisfaction derived).
24. This approach is largely subjective and close to an assessment of utility. More objective
well-being assessments could be undertaken by focusing on health care, education, longevity, etc.
25. Economics as a discipline is somewhat inclusive, and a great deal of the writing about
behavior assumptions and happiness is found in economic journals. One might have expected the
economics applied to law to have followed these tendencies. That has not, by and large, been the
case. Although economics has responded and advanced in response to the four objections to
efficiency listed above and is continually reassessing "efficiency," for reasons about which one can
only speculate, those advances have been only partially incorporated into law and economics.
Representative of the methodological stickiness of law and economics is the seventh edition of Judge
Posner's treatise. See POSNER, supra note 9. It steadfastly adheres to the approach introduced
thirty-five years earlier. The principal difference is an effort to specify the rationality assumption.
Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 5 (1972), with POSNER, supra note 9,
at 15-20. This position is further explained in Posner, supra note 20.
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any other way to assess legal rules with respect to a generally acceptable
standard?
The challenge of reconciling economic analysis with happiness research
is great. First, in terms of theory generally, most law and economics theory
is based on the rejection of the possibility of an interpersonal comparison of
utility that would allow observers to know when and if people are actually
better off or experience higher utility. Can the economic analysis of law,
and especially the concept of efficiency, be reshaped somehow to allow for
what we are now learning about actual outcomes and the sources of
happiness? Second, What does it mean for law itself? Presumably law
exists as a means of altering behavior in a generally beneficial way.
"Beneficial" is, however, a slippery term, and happiness research reveals a
great deal of complexity. Third, the notion of assessing actual outcomes or
true welfare leads back to utilitarianism or the possibility of resource
allocations that maximize aggregate ex post well-being. Does anything
about happiness treat the problems of utilitarianism, including those features
that are morally repugnant to many? Fourth, Is it really utility (or happiness)
that should be maximized even if it is possible to assess actual as opposed to
predicted utility? For example, a strict adherence to utility does not account
for the fact that some people learn to be happier with less than other far more
affluent people want and, often, frequently acquire. In a sense, the poorer
person may feel happy, but this may not reflect his actual state of well-
being. One of the factors that detractors from law and economics find
worrisome is its indifference to the question of actual as opposed to
subjective well-being. Yet the possibility of recognizing this distinction is
discussed with some frequency by economists 26 and sociologists.
27
III. EFFICIENCY AND HAPPINESS
As already noted, economics and happiness are intertwined by their joint
concerns with utility. This is actually a two-edged similarity. It is possibly
beneficial because findings with respect to actual as opposed to expected
happiness would appear to overcome the problem of revealed preferences
and other objections to economic efficiency as a standard. On the other
hand, it seems likely that happiness assessments share some of the ills of
26. The most important contributor here is Amartya Sen. For a general presentation, see
AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985).
27. Here the most important theories are those relating to relative deprivation. See infra notes
233-236; see also infra Part V.B.3.
standard utilitarianism. To understand both of these effects, it is useful to
begin with a slightly closer look at the evolution of efficiency.
A. A Short History of Economic Efficiency
Efficiency, especially in the context of welfare economics, has always
been a problem for economists. Modem considerations of efficiency begin
with Jeremy Bentham. The criticisms of utilitarianism, as described by
Bentham, are well-known and not reviewed here.28 For the most part, these
criticisms stem from moral questions like whether the goal is to maximize
average or total utility; whether animals, other than humans, count; and how
to address utility monsters-those who derive great utility from harming
others. It is important to note, though, that Bentham's notion of utility was
not based on predictions or revealed preferences; instead, "[b]y utility is
meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit,
advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, ... or... to prevent the happening
of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness. 29 Utility, under his formulation,
was the potential of an "object" to produce happiness or unhappiness.
He did not say, however, that the potential was the same for all possible
owners. Thus, the practical question arose of how to determine whether a
change in a resource allocation increased actual utility or pleasure. For
example, there is no way to know if a wealthy person derives less utility
from $10 spent on a cigar than a poor and hungry person would derive from
eating a meal that costs $10.30 The absence of a suitable answer on this
matter of interpersonal comparisons of utility creates a great deal of
uncertainty as far as policy.31
The next most fundamental step in the evolution of efficiency, and one
that recognized the interpersonal comparison problem, came in the form of
Pareto superiority.32 More specifically, if interpersonal comparisons of
utility are impossible, at least intrapersonal comparisons are possible. Thus,
a change in position by a single person that makes that person better off and
no one worse off is superior utility-wise than the ex ante position. More
importantly, if two people enter into an exchange that leaves them both
better off and no one worse off, overall happiness or utility is increased.
28. See J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMSON, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973);
R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 118-34 (1962).
29. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2
(Dover Publications 2007) (1823).
30. See Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment, 48 ECON. J. 635,
635-41 (1938).
31. For a study suggesting that interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible, see Daniel
Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham: Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q. J. ECON. 375 (1997).
32. This is not to say that Paretian standards replaced utilitarianism. See SEN, supra note 26, at
30-32.
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These changes are referred to as Pareto superior states. A Pareto optimal
state is one in which no reallocation could improve the position of one party
without making another party worse off.
This relatively conservative notion of efficiency also left a great deal to
be desired. One problem is that Pareto must have been referring to
"expected utility" as opposed to actual utility or happiness. Once the
exchange takes place, there is no way of knowing whether either party
actually experiences a higher level of utility. In addition, there are many-
perhaps an infinite number-of Pareto optimal states. Some of these could
very well be ones in which people are relatively miserable. Selecting one
Pareto superior outcome over another means engaging in something akin to
an interpersonal comparison of utility.33 In effect, Pareto leaves open the
possibility that choices may not be consistent with experienced utility and
provides no economic guidance for when redistributions would lead to
higher levels of utility.
34
The effort to bring a more practical element to the Paretian notion of
efficiency can be traced to the work of Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks in
the first half of the twentieth century. This critical step took place in the
context of questioning whether welfare economics or economics generally
has anything useful to say proscriptively. In other words, if utilities cannot
be compared unless one makes the assumption that individuals are uniform
in their preferences and the ability to sense happiness, What can economics
offer with respect to policies? To this, Kaldor answered:
[W]here a certain policy leads to an increase in physical
productivity, and thus of aggregate real income, the economist's
case for the policy is quite unaffected by the question of the
comparability of individual satisfactions; since in all such cases it is
possible to make everybody better off than before, or at any rate to
make some people better off without making anybody worse off.
3
33. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509,
515-18 (1980).
34. Amartya Sen suggests that two strains of utilitarianism can be described, one dealing with
pleasure or happiness and the other focusing on desires. See SEN, supra note 26, at 17. These two
approaches can, however, be reconciled. See RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND
THE RIGHT 95-98 (1979).
35. Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of
Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939).
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Hicks, writing three months later, applied the same notion to the special
case of organizing an industry into fewer firms: "Before recommending in
practice a policy of shutting down redundant firms, we ought to be sure that
the full condition is satisfied; and we ought to be very sure that the discarded
factors will in fact be transferred to more productive uses. 36
In effect, wealth maximization became the surrogate for utility
maximization. Thus, even if some parties were made worse off, a policy
could be viewed as efficient as long as those losses were offset by larger
gains to others. It is important to note that, in fact, by the late 1930s, two
changes to the pure notion of utility maximization had occurred that
separated it from actual happiness or utility. One was the shift from utility
to wealth as something to be maximized. The other was a shift to ex ante
assessments. In short, these two steps can be viewed as refinements to the
concept of efficiency in an effort to perpetuate a branch of
economics called welfare economics. 37 On first impression, direct attention
to actual happiness would seem to make these accommodations unnecessary.
1. The Shift to Wealth as Opposed to Expected Utility or Actual
Happiness
The substitution of value-the Kaldor-Hicks standard of efficiency 38-
for utility creates the question of whether value as expressed by willingness
to pay is a reliable indicator of the utility derived from a good, service, or
rule.39 In his 1981 book, The Economics of Justice,4 ° Judge Posner took on
the task of defending Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as an "ethically attractive"
standard.4' His argument consisted principally of noting that wealth
maximization did not share the unacceptable characteristics of the two other
competing efficiency standards-Paretianism and utilitarianism. 42 According
36. J. R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 EcON. J. 696, 711 (1939).
37. Economics would have remained viable in other areas without this adaptation. It would have
remained both important as a source of descriptive information about past economic performance
and important for forecasting. In addition, the assessment of costs of production, the impact of
interest rates, and forecasting would all have remained relatively intact. Without this adaptation,
however, any connection between economics and happiness would have dropped significantly.
Ironically, the accommodations necessary to preserve welfare economics have actually increased the
distance between efficiency and actual happiness or utility.
38. See Hicks, supra note 36; Kaldor, supra note 35.
39. While it is traditional to think in terms of the efficient allocation of goods and services, law
and economics often addresses the issue of whether specific legal rules are efficient.
40. POSNER, supra note 6, at 88-115.
41. For further reading, Posner's defense also appeared in two articles. See Richard A. Posner,
The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 487 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 9 J. LEGAL.
STUD. 103 (1979).
42. POSNER, supra note 6, at 88-115.
944
[Vol. 36: 935, 2009] Happiness, Efficiency, and Decisional Equity
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
to Posner, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is superior to Pareto efficiency because it
allows for greater flexibility. 43 Under Paretian standards, redistributions are
only permitted when at least one person is made better off and no one is
worse off. The Kaldor-Hicks standard avoids the problems of interpersonal
comparisons and other well-known hazards of utilitarianism by requiring
those with greater desires to back up those needs with spending. For
example, the so-called utility monster is less of a threat-those who claim
that their utility would be increased when it means disutility for others
would have to demonstrate an ability to pay for what is, in effect, the use of
others. The fact that the payment could be made is all that is necessary for
the Kaldor-Hicks standard to be met.
Although wealth maximization remains the baseline concept of
efficiency in the economic analysis of law, Judge Posner's effort to turn it
into an ethically acceptable standard has not been successful. The sharpest
criticism focuses on the disconnect between Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and the
attractive elements of either Paretianism or utilitarianism. 44 For example,
wealth maximization permits involuntary transfers of wealth, thus violating
the strong autonomy-protecting element of Paretianism. Conversely, the
connection between wealth--or the willingness to pay-for a good or
service is not demonstrably connected to utility. Thus, Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency cannot deliver on the one possibly saving grace of utilitarianism:
the maximization of total utility or happiness. 45 In effect, while adoption of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is a convenient substitute for utilitarianism, it
possesses no independent core principle that elevates it to a stand-alone
moral guideline.
The problems created by a shift from utility to wealth maximization
would appear to be solved by a direct focus on happiness. Although people
have different capacities to express themselves in the market, the capacity to
feel actual joy, happiness, or utility is not tied to an ability to pay. As will
be discussed below, however, while it is likely that the capacity to have
positive feelings is unrelated to income, this does not answer the question of
whether other factors may be controlling and their legal relevance. It also
does not help answer the question of what "positive" feelings should mean
as a guide for legal rules and institutions. Just as problems arise with the
43. Id. at 91-92.
44. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 33; Kronman, supra note 6; see also GILBERT, supra note 4,
at 260-6 1.
45. Further concerns are expressed in LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS
WELFARE 28-32 (2002).
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substitution of wealth for happiness, the problems of stressing outcome over
process remains.
2. Expectations as Opposed to Outcomes
The second step, from actual to expected, means that utility or happiness
assessments must be based on present or past choices and experiences, either
partially or totally. The theory is that choices reveal preferences that are
based on utility or happiness. The idea that choices reveal preferences is an
important one because it supposedly removes the problem of assessing
utility.46  There are, however, many reasons why choices may not reveal
preferences or actual utility. Most certainly they do not reveal fully
informed preferences.47 There is a large body of literature illustrating that
choices may reveal as much about how the choice is framed as they reveal
about actual preference.48 Strategic behavior may also be designed to
conceal actual preference. 49 The only thing that can confidently be said is
that choices reveal choices.
Recent scholarship in economics and sociology has begun to focus on
this problem. For example, psychologist Daniel Gilbert points out that the
question is determining how much "goodness" dollars buy.5° Gilbert and
others5' note that this is not the way economists typically approach the issue.
A choice when made is viewed as utility-maximizing, and the actual
outcome is not something that economists have, until recently, been inclined
to explore." Daniel Kahneman, Peter Wakker, and Rahesh Sarin capture
this distinction, distinguishing "decision utility" from "experienced
utility."" They describe the circularity of conventional economics like this:
"In current economics and in decision theory, the utility of outcomes and
attributes refers to their weight in decisions: utility is inferred from observed
46. As Paul Samuelson said, the theory is "freed from any vestigial traces of the utility concept."
P.A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA 61, 71 (1938).
47. At some point the cost of additional useful information will exceed the expected benefit in
terms of outcome from that information.
48. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Framing Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981); see also, Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values
and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 342 (1984); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The
Psychology of Preferences, 246 Scl. AM. 160 (1982); Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, Willingness to
Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures
of Value, 99 Q. J. ECON. 507 (1984).
49. See Amartya Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, 40 ECONOMICA 241, 250 (1973).
50. GILBERT, supra 4, at 260.
51. SEN, supra note 26, at 9-10.
52. GILBERT, supra note 4, at 260. But see Eric Van den Steen, Rational Overoptimism (And
Other Biases), 94 AM. ECON. REv. 1141 (2004).
53. Kahneman et al., supra note 31, at 375.
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choices and is in turn used to explain these choices. '54 A good example is
found in Fairness Versus Welfare by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell.5"
The authors start their defense of welfare as opposed to fairness-seeking
policies with, "[W]e observe that we will usually assume that individuals
comprehend fully how various situations affect their well-being and there is
no basis for anyone to question their conception of what is good for them.,
56
The authors contrast their assumption with "actual" well-being.57 Of course,
there is a difference between thinking one knows what is good for oneself
and being right about the matter. Or, put differently, people cannot know
what will make them happier until they experience the outcome of the
choice. 8
Here again, a direct focus on actual feelings seems to avoid the problem
of revealed preferences. On the other hand, actual outcomes remain the
results of choices. Unless there is some method not simply to determine
what choices make people better off or feel better off but to link the choices
and good outcomes, simply knowing the aftermath of a choice does not
represent great progress. Again, a focus solely on outcomes--even happy
outcomes-does not resolve the problem of defining proper legal rules and
institutions.
B. Actual Happiness and Behavioral Assumptions
Suppose the problems related to the substitution of wealth for feelings
and the differences between predicted and actual outcomes did not exist.
Does this mean that happiness research and its implementation would or
should reassure the detractors of conventional economic analysis? This
would depend on whether direct happiness assessments avoid the two most
critical behavioral assumptions of law and economics.
54. Id.
55. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 45, at 23.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 23 n.14; see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People and the
Obligations of Legal Theory, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 1,4 (1997).
58. One should not be too quick to condemn economists on this point of view. First, it is only
recently that economists and others have begun to seriously consider the possibility of interpersonal
comparisons. Second, economists make no secret of the limitations this placed on their analysis.
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1. Do People Maximize?
One problem that happiness research and proposals seem unable to
avoid is the assumption that people are interested in maximizing anything
and, in particular, self-interest. Note that this is different from asking
whether they are successful at maximizing anything. Instead, the question is
whether they start out with goals that are only self-regarding. From the
standpoint of conventional economics, as discussed above,5 9 the question of
whether all decisions are wholly self-regarding can be short-circuited by
claiming that all choices reveal one's preferences. In the words of Amartya
Sen: "[N]o matter whether you are a single-minded egoist or a raving altruist
or a class conscious militant, you will appear to be maximizing your own
utility .... ,,60 Thus, in the terms Amartya Sen has used, Are individuals
capable of "counter-preferential choice? '61 For example, Is it possible to
make a choice based on the sense that the outcome is fair or consistent with
firmly held principles without feeling personally better off or happier as a
result of the choice? If so, the notion that people strive only to increase their
income, utility, or well-being is, at best, an unverified assumption.
This problem seems to be resolved by efforts to measure happiness. But
consider this assumption in the context of one of the major theories about
actual happiness-the set point model.62 Under this model, parties adapt to
new situations and return to the same level of happiness. If something
unfortunate happens, there is a drop in happiness followed by an adjustment
back to the former level of happiness. The same cycle recurs if there is a
temporary increase in happiness. The theory seems quite far from ideas like
wealth maximization and revealed preferences. In fact, one implication is
that it is not what people have but who they are that counts. The set point
model and the idea that what matters most is "who one is" fit nicely with the
proposition that happiness is genetically determined.63 What these theories
of happiness suggest is that those interested in maximizing actual well-being
would do well to concentrate on minimizing the period of time for an
adaptation to negative events and maximizing the period of adaptation to
positive events.
It is not clear why the maximization assumption would be less important
for a happiness model than it would be for a conventional economic model.
Suppose law were designed to maximize actual as opposed to expected
happiness or wealth. Further suppose, however, that not every person all the
59. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
60. Sen, supra note 11, at 323.
61. Id.
62. Lucas et al., supra note 4.
63. See David Lykken & Auke Tellegen, Happiness Is a Stochastic Phenomenon, 7 PSYcHOL.
SCi. 186 (1996).
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time is attempting to maximize that happiness. Efforts to assess the
effectiveness of those laws that focus on actual happiness would be no more
useful than the ex ante or predicted wealth maximization effects that are
currently considered. In effect, the rules would be comparable to installing a
powerful engine into a car owned by people who are not interested in how
fast they can go.
2. Are Choices or Outcomes Rational?
Closely related to the maximization assumption is the rationality
assumption.64 Even if individuals are wholly self-interested, Do they make
decisions in a way that is consistent with achieving that end? The
assumption is crucial because the economic analysis of law assumes that
individuals respond to costs and benefits in certain ways. For example, the
concept of the efficient breach assumes that individuals will breach contracts
when the opportunity costs of not doing so is relatively high.65 Similarly,
the notion of efficient levels of crime is based on the idea of a cost-benefit
analysis in which expected gains from violating a law are compared with the
expected punishment.66
Whether talking about efficiency or happiness, the rationality question
can be answered in a way that skirts the issue while revealing its complexity
and importance. For example, even inconsistent choices may seem to be
consistent if one allows for changes in preference. Take the young man who
wakes up in the morning and resolves not to eat sweets as a way of losing
weight. At lunch he buys a big jelly doughnut and coffee with cream and
sugar. One explanation is irrationality: the decision seems inconsistent. On
the other hand, the decision may be rational if, by "sweets," he was thinking
of chocolate. It is also rational if he changed his mind at ten and decided not
to diet after all. Of course, it could be rational as well if he really does want
to lose weight but not at the expense of eating whatever and whenever he
chooses.
Even if happiness, as opposed to expected utility, is used as a standard,
consistent choice making must still be assumed. The problem is that legal
rules cannot help but be formulated in terms of costs, other sanctions, and
rewards. More generally, any output-related goal requires an assumption
64. It is possible to take the view that the idea of maximization means rationality. This
simplifies the analysis but at the expense of recognizing the possibility that one may intend to be
wholly self-serving but go about it in an inconsistent way.
65. See, e.g., JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES THEEUWEs, LAW AND ECONOMICS 229-30 (2008).
66. See id. at 396-405.
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about behavior. The proposition, in a happiness analysis, is that people will
make decisions that channel them into happier outcomes. The fact that
actual happiness is somehow assessed or measured does not alter this
equation and the necessity of some assumption about likely behavior or
responses when a legal measure is taken. But that assumption will remain
an assumption that a great deal of examination has drawn into question.67
For example, suppose there are no speed limits. Some people will drive at
unsafe speeds. Others may either drive less or enjoy it less for fear of
carnage on the highways. Now suppose a speed limit is imposed. After the
measure, the people who were afraid are happier and drive more or less
stress-free. One might conclude that they have had a rational reaction to
greater safety. First, note that the most one can say is that people seemed to
have a rational response in this particular circumstance. This depends on an
assumption of what a rational response should be, which is not the same as
whether people actually were rational. In particular, more and happier
driving is compared to prior levels of driving and happiness. But the
"before" level may itself have been "irrational" in that it was an over-
reaction to actual danger. This is not so much a criticism of economic
analysis or happiness assessments. It is simply to note that the success of
any policy taken is dependent on a belief that people will act rationally.
IV. FROM THE PREDICTIONS OF ACQUISITIVE PEOPLE TO A DIRECT
ASSESSMENT OF HAPPINESS
If the notion of ex post happiness is not useful as a way to mend
traditional economics in order to respond to its critics, Could one focus on
happiness alone as a goal for legal rules? In this formulation, the goal would
be simply to create as much actual happiness as possible. Five complexities
come into play. What they suggest is that any outcome-oriented approach to
law is likely to be too complex and indeterminate to be a useful guide. First,
Does everyone become happy or achieve higher states of utility in the same
way? Second, if "ignorance is bliss," Is it a legitimate form of happiness?
Third, How are subjective and objective well-being related? More
specifically, Is there a difference between a sense of being better off and
actually being better off? Fourth, Does utility have a temporal quality and
how? Finally, How does the concept of legal efficiency accommodate what
Amartya Sen describes as the "capabilities" problem? 68
67. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
68. SEN, supra note 26.
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A. Paths to Happiness and Well-Being
At the most basic economic level, the view is that people increase
utility, even ex post, by acquiring needed or wanted goods or services. This
is, however, a very narrow approach to happiness, 69 and in reality, happiness
can be achieved by at least three paths.7 ° The first way of becoming happier
is represented by a person who consciously wants something-a new job, a
new car, etc.-feels its absence, and acquires whatever that is by virtue of a
transaction. The critical feature here is the sense of desire. One can view
this as an effort to extinguish disutility. In its extreme form, the longing is
so severe that the person simply cannot be happy unless that person obtains a
new job or car. The longing is always there and consistently takes the edge
off any short-term feelings of well-being.
For a very practical illustration, consider Richard Easterlin's explanation
for why rising income over lifetimes does not result in comparable increases
in happiness.7 As income grows it tends to generate higher levels of
material aspirations. This results in a disconnect between expectation of
utility and experienced utility. The problem is that at one level of income
people tend to anticipate being better off with a higher level of income
because they envision matching that future income with current aspirations.
When that higher level of income is achieved, the matching reference is
then-current aspirations, which are higher. In effect, people make
assessments and decisions based on a state that changes once the decision is
made. This is significant in two ways. Revealed preferences take place in
the context of preferences that may change the instant a preference is
actually revealed. One solution is to make decisions based on realistic
expectations. Another is to limit the seemingly endless increase in material
aspirations.
A second way of becoming happier is achieved when the relatively
happy person becomes happier. Here there is no sense of loss or disutility
leading to an effort to address the suffering of wanting something. If you
spoke to this person about his happiness, he might say, "I am perfectly
happy, but I would be happier still if I had a Rolex watch." Again, there is
69. See generally Bernard M.S. van Praag & Paul Frijters, The Measurement of Welfare and
Well-Being: The Leyden Approach, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY,
supra note 4, at 413.
70. This puts aside the highly individualized utility-affecting responses to various stimuli. See
Ito & Cacioppo, supra note 4.
71. See Easterlin, Happiness ofAll, supra note 4; Easterlin, Explaining Happiness, supra note 4;
Easterlin, Income and Happiness, supra note 4.
no sense of longing or disutility. A third person may simply be content or
happy enough that she does not fit into either of these categories. This
person does not define happiness in terms of what she has or does not have.
"Things" are not the source of happiness. Instead, happiness can be said to
come from within in perhaps a very literal sense.72
If the distance between happiness and unhappiness is seen as a gap
associated with the difference between what one has and what one wants,
there are two ways to close the gap. One is to acquire the things desired as
is the case with the first path. The other is simply to not want in the first
place. This eliminates the "suffering" of wanting what one does not have.
This is reminiscent of the four basic truths in Buddhism and the theme that
suffering can be traced directly to attachment.73
It is important to note that this category does not include the person who
does not want a Rolex watch because he does not know they exist or the
child who does not want cereal with sparkles because he has not seen the ad
on television with multi-colored cartoon characters. Rather, this person
adopts the Zen-like perspective that all suffering is a result of desire and the
elimination of desire in a generalized sense is the path to well-being.
Frankly, it is not clear whether this person can be regarded as "happy" or
merely "not unhappy."
Although the first and third approaches eliminate unhappiness, they are
otherwise worlds apart. The first approach-the one most closely
approximating the conventional economic view of the matter-involves a
constant process of suffering or wanting, and extinguishing that feeling. In
effect, happiness is the reaction to unhappiness. Acquisition, like a
painkiller, temporarily masks the disutility. Under the third approach,
disutility is dealt with directly.
The recognition that happiness is not just a function of acquiring things
to offset a sense of longing has a number of implications. First, it seems
clear that the usual view of "economic man" as a rational maximizer of self-
interest is inadequate. This version of efficiency is somewhat like the old
joke about why someone is pounding her head against a wall. The answer is
because it feels so good when she stops. Specifically, unhappiness leads to
happiness. A more precise examination of utility or happiness if one takes
this route is to examine net utility. Even if people feel better off through
acquisition, Would utility be even higher if the sense of missing something
had not occurred in the first place?
72. See Lykken & Tellegen, supra note 63.
73. See David Burton, Knowledge and Liberation: Philosophical Ruminations on a Buddhist
Conundrum, 52 PHIL. E. & W. 326 (2002); see also Christina Feldman, The Four Noble Truths: Path
of Transformation, in VOICES OF INSIGHT 103 (Sharon Salzburg ed., 1999).
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The idea of becoming happier by wanting less is not the usual province
of law or economics. It is not, however, a far-fetched idea. Learning to be
happy with how things are is probably an important component of virtually
everyone's emotional make-up. There are actually practical applications of
this idea. For example, restrictions on advertising aimed at children are a
good example of increasing happiness by eliminating a sense of longing. In
fact, a great deal of modem advertising can be seen as an effort to create
desire, disutility, or suffering that is then remedied by acquisition.
Another possible way to categorize this person or path raises the issue of
contentment. Perhaps the person who extinguishes desire not through
acquiring things but through acting directly on the desire problem is merely
"content." One could argue that being content exists apart from the state of
being happy or less happy and that it is incorrect to think in terms of
maximizing anything. Perhaps the goal should simply be to achieve the
highest incidence of people who answer "yes" to the question "Are you
content?" On the other hand, if there is a possibility of being more or less
content, the logic loops back to the happiness-efficiency discussion. This
means considering something like "absolute contentment." Whether this is a
meaningful concept, unless one is talking about something like a rock or a
spoon full of water, is questionable.
Regardless of how one feels about the path to happiness, one should
notice the complexity these possibilities pose for a theory of efficiency based
on experienced happiness. If we could all agree that utility is maximized by
having a world full of "not unhappy" people, Does that mean massive
investment in meditation and Zen lectures for all? On the other hand, if
utility maximization means "happy but could be happier still," that seems to
call for a policy of raising the fortunes of all people to some minimum level.
For the first person-the habitually unhappy person who allows one need to
override all other sources of happiness-the utility-maximizing approach
may mean an investment in psychotherapy or mood-altering drugs. In fact,
from the standpoint of maximizing utility, that may be a terrifically
favorable investment. The point is that maximizing utility requires some
attention to what it takes for various types of people to be happy. It may
also mean not just addressing the sources of happiness but the "happiness
producers"-i.e., decision-making processes-themselves to ensure they are
as effective as possible at producing happiness.
74
74. This is a dangerous path to travel down. If "we" know that a person could be happier after
psychotherapy and medication, Does that translate into a right or even an obligation to force the
issue? The easy answer, even from a utilitarian perspective, is probably "no" because of the
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Finally, as already noted, Is it useful to separate experienced utility or
contentment from well-being in a more objective sense? The answer, as is
the case with respect to many questions, is "yes" and "no." As the following
section indicates, being happy or content may be a function of a variety of
factors that are unrelated to one's well-being. On the other hand, a feeling
of having been treated fairly or an absence of stress may both have an
impact as an objective matter on one's health and cannot be discounted even
if it is strictly an emotional state.
B. Well-Being, Ignorance, and Adaptation
"Ignorance is bliss" is more than a trite expression. There seems to be
little doubt that it is also true. The matter of ignorance can be viewed in two
ways. One is true ignorance in which a person simply does not know
information that would result in disutility. The other is a contrived or
adaptive ignorance subconsciously designed to avoid dissonance and,
therefore, disutility.75 In the first form a person may not know what is
possible or what others have. For example, an employee may be entirely
satisfied with a certain salary increase as long as the employee has no
inkling that other similar employees are receiving higher increases. Or, the
buyer of a car may be satisfied with the price paid but then become upset
upon learning that others have paid less. Similarly, not knowing that one is
among the highest paid employees or that one has received an especially
good price on a car may lead to feeling less happy than the reality warrants.
These possibilities create awkward decisions for the person interested in
actual well-being. It suggests that the impact of information be considered
before it is disseminated.
The implications of simply not knowing as being instrumental in
achieving happiness are closely related to the ideas of John Stuart Mill on
different qualities of utilities.76 For example, an evening at the opera may
create more utility than watching Dancing with the Stars on television. The
possibility that there are different grades of utility may seem odd or even
objectionable, but the possibility is a core question. Suppose after
experiencing both, people consistently choose the opera over Dancing with
the Stars. Is it possible to then conclude that people who watch Dancing
with the Stars are deriving less utility than people who attend the opera? In
a sense, they settle for a lower form of utility because they do not know of
an option. Put in slightly different terms, if everyone who sampled filet
mignon after eating hamburger preferred filet mignon, Is it safe to conclude
disutility of living in a society in which unhappy people are forced to accept treatment.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 240-248.
76. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 8 (George Sher, ed., Hackett Pub'g Co. 2d ed.
2001) (1861).
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that filet mignon is a superior pleasure than hamburger? If so, to maximize
happiness, in addition to sheltering people from information that would be
disquieting, one would also have to consider assisting people in developing
more sophisticated tastes. Of course, this assumes that those tastes can be
satisfied. Enlightening someone about the pleasures of opera or filet mignon
only to tell them "but not for you" would only serve to decrease overall
utility.
Closely related to the idea of ignorance as a critical element in
maximizing utility is the concept of "relative deprivation."77  In effect, a
person assesses his or her position by reference to others in some defined
group. The first studies go back to military personnel in the 1940s in which
groups with greater benefits were unhappier than groups with less. 8 The
key is whether individuals feel relatively deprived with respect to the
relevant group for comparison. For example, a person who has little or is
deprived in an absolute sense may not feel that something is missing. A
common response to those asked about why they do not feel deprived is that
they simply do not think in those terms. It would not occur to them to
compare what they have with what others have outside their immediate
reference group.7 9 If people pick the right group, they are less likely to be
unhappy than if they select the "wrong" group.
There is a bit of a twist to consider here. One might initially think that
the relevant reference group is outside the control of the individual. It is not
clear that this is true.80 Think of the price an individual pays in terms of
dissonance, suffering, and even humiliation if that individual attempts to
behave and have the expectations of a more affluent group. The disutility in
a variety of forms can be quite high. In reality, people adapt to their
situations to avoid these sources of unhappiness. 81 One adaptation is to
relate to groups that create more "comfort." Thus, one may achieve greater
77. As discussed below, this concept may also affect decision making in ways that cause it to
deviate from decisional equity. See infra text accompanying notes 230-235.
78. 1 SAMUEL A. STOUFFER ET. AL., THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT DURING ARMY
LIFE (1949). See also generally, J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267, 269 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965); see also Paul D.
Sweeney et al., Using Relative Deprivation Theory to Explain Satisfaction with Income and Pay
Level: A Multistudy Examination, 33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 423 (1990).
79. See Joanne Martin, The Tolerance of Injustice, in 4 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL
COMPARISON: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 217 (James M. Olsen et. al. eds., 1986).
80. See infra text accompanying notes 233-240.
81. This can be referred to as the "adaptation problem." See Mozaffar Qizilbash, Well-Being,
Adaptation and Human Limitations, in PREFERENCES AND WELL-BEING 83 (Serena Olsaretti ed.,
2006).
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happiness by expecting less, and the route to expecting less may be to
compare oneself to those similarly situated in society.82
Relative deprivation may explain why some groups consistently accept
contractual outcomes that other groups regard as unfair and unacceptable.83
For example, it is possible that racial discrimination in wages or in the price
of cars and other products can be traced to an expectation by sellers that
members of minority groups are likely to compare their individual outcomes
with the outcomes of the group. To the extent they receive lower wages or
pay higher prices, a feeling of deprivation may not emerge.
Similarly, the process of revolution or the form it takes may depend on
the individual developing a sense of deserving better.84 In other words, the
position to which one is relegated in a social structure must create a sense of
dissatisfaction. Those who effectively adapt may not achieve that level of
dissatisfaction. This leads to the difficult question of whether a necessary
step toward greater utility is the creation, initially, of disutility. But the
question is even more complicated. Suppose a person's consciousness is
raised with respect to that person's relative deprivation. Through social
change or individual efforts, that person may achieve whatever is sought.
Still, there is no assurance that a new level of unhappiness will not simply
return. In fact, the set point theory of happiness is that people may
experience short-term happiness or unhappiness but then adjust and return to
their original state.
The implications of this for any form of efficiency-whether wealth-
based or ex post utility-based-are profound. If the goal really is to
maximize happiness and one can be happy as a result of imperfect
information or as a result of not recognizing a different allocation as
something one has a claim to, What does that mean? One possibility is to
not do anything that will result in disutility. This means perpetuating the
ignorance. The other option is to increase disutility by raising the
consciousness of people as to other possibilities and assisting them in
developing a taste for and a sense of entitlement to those possibilities.
Only if that disutility is offset by future happiness would this seem to make
82. See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 145 (1983);
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 Wm. & MARY L. REV.
.445 (1994); Cass A. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129,
1152 (1986); SEN, supra note 26, at 46-47.
83. For a discussion, see Harrison, supra note 82, at 440-45.
84. See generally William H. Panning, Inequality, Social Comparison, and Relative Deprivation,
77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1983); Faye Crosby, Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to
Miller, Bolce, and Halligan, 73 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 103 (1979); Ted Robert Gurr, Sources of
Rebellion in Western Societies: Some Quantitative Results, 392 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
Sci. 129 (1970).
85. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Preferences, Paternalism, and Liberty, in
PREFERENCES AND WELL-BEING, supra note 81, at 233.
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sense. It is important to note that this is all aside from the issue of whether
-the individuals involved are in fact better off by any objective standard.
C. Well-Being: Sensing and Being
An additional problem is that having a sense of well-being-being
happier-is not always the same as experiencing well-being.86 If the goal is
happiness, then if a person who is a smoker, a poorly educated person, or a
sickly person feels happy, that is the end of the analysis. Objective well-
being is quite different, and this is captured by Thomas Scanlon in his
defense of an objective perspective:
I mean a criterion that provides a basis for appraisal of a person's
level of well-being which is independent of that person's tastes and
interests, thus allowing for the possibility that such an appraisal
could be correct even though it conflicted with the preferences of
the individual in question, not only as he believes they are but even
as they would be if rendered consistent, corrected for factual errors,
etc.87
In effect, one could assess happiness not as actual happiness but in terms of
how happy the person should be if tastes and preferences were
"normalized."
The greater problem is not understanding the distinction but in dealing
with the interdependency between the subjective and objective. This
interdependency goes both ways. For example, being better off is likely to
be accompanied by feelings of being better off. A pain-wracked person who
undergoes a successful medical procedure to relieve the pain, all other
factors being constant, is better off and undoubtedly feels better off. Even if,
as set point theory suggests, one's feeling better off is temporary, it is hard
not to regard the outcome as successful. Conversely, a sense of being
happy, satisfied, or at least having lower levels of stress has been associated
with objective measures of well-being.8" But take the harder case. Suppose
two people are exactly the same with respect to any measure of objective
86. See generally FREY & STUTZER, supra note 4, at 4-6.
87. Thomas M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655, 658 (1975).
88. See Nan Lin & Walter M. Ensel, Life Stress and Health: Stressors and Resources, 54 AM.
Soc. REv. 382 (1989); see also Patrick A. Bovier et al., Perceived Stress, Internal Resources, and
Social Support as Determinants of Mental Health Among Young Adults, 13 QuALITY LIFE RES. 161
(2004).
well-being. One person is quite happy and the other is unhappy. Even
though the difference appears to be subjective only, it would be hard to
make the case that the happier person is not also objectively better off. The
point for efficiency theory is that neither subjective well-being (utility) nor
objective well-being can be considered alone.
D. The Fleeting Nature of Happiness
The process of assessing objective and subjective well-being is daunting
and deservedly so. Add to this the possibility that assessing happiness may
be a bit like lifting water with a net. As already noted, one theory-set
point-is that people tend to be happy, unhappy, or somewhere in between.
Events may move them to higher or lower levels of happiness but only
temporarily. While set point theory usually deals with good or bad things
that happen to people, it has implications as well for decision making. If
people tend to adjust, "right" or "wrong" decisions are likely to be relatively
unimportant. For example, a diner reveals a preference for steak. It turns
out to be tough and unsatisfying. The diner will get over it. In this nihilistic
view of utility, not much matters.
That is not to say that researchers have not discovered a great deal about
happiness and utility. In some studies employing the "experience sampling"
method, subjects note contemporaneously what they are doing and the level
of satisfaction or dissatisfaction.8 9 It is comparable to a running commentary
on their feelings. Daniel Kahneman and his coauthors have utilized a
variation of this approach in which subjects are asked to reflect on the
previous day and list activities and levels of pleasure. 90 In effect, they
reconstruct. In that survey, the highest level of satisfaction is derived from
sex and the lowest from commuting to and from work.91 The difference
between experience sampling and day reconstruction is in the time at which
feelings are assessed.
In fact, Kahneman notes at least six ways the question of utility can be
posed.92  First is "instant utility"-how one is feeling at the moment.93
Second is "remembered utility," which is utility one assigns after the fact.94
For example, "How was the sex, meal, or lecture?" Third are measures
based on a more general assessment of specific components of one's life-
89. See Kahneman et. al., supra note 23, at 430-32.
90. See Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experiences: The Day
Reconstruction Method, 306 SCIENCE 1776 (2004).
91. Id. at 1777 tbl. 1.
92. Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 4, at 3, 4.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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"How do you feel about your job or your spouse?"95 Fourth is the more
global question, "How happy are you?, 96 Kahneman and his coauthors also
identify "decision utility" and "predicted utility." 97 Decision utility is the
"weight of an outcome in a decision." 98 Predicted utility is a forecast of the
utility to be derived from a choice.99
Three points are particularly important with respect to these different
approaches. First, the utility question can vary in both scope and timing. On
a grid it might look something like Figure 1.
Figure 1
The combination of utility assessment possibilities is endless. 00 Is it
more relevant to ask, "How are you enjoying your meal now?" or, two years
later, "How did you like the meal you had at that restaurant?" Or even, "Are
your memories of the meal pleasant ones?" To understand the importance of
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Kahneman et. al., supra note 31.
98. Id. at 375.
99. Id. at 378.
100. In fact all time periods may interact to create the current sense of happiness. See Wladyslaw
Tatarkiewicz, Happiness and Time, 27 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 1 (1966).
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Reflections
Specific Question General Question
Contemporaneous
the differences, most readers can relate to the same questioning about a book
or a movie. How much they enjoyed either one may depend on when they
are asked. Or they may say "I enjoyed it at the time but now I am not so
sure." Similarly, "How happy are you with your job?" may elicit a different
response than "Looking back on your career, how satisfying was it to you?"
The grid assists in visualizing the utility problem but, in fact, may
actually oversimplify the complexity. In particular, a question about
experienced or instant utility will not account for future pleasure derived
from recalling the experience. Even an assessment of remembered utility at
any particular moment may not account for subsequent recollections. In
addition, How does one evaluate an extreme positive or negative experience
that is virtually forgotten as compared to a less intense experience that
remains vivid and from which one continues to experience utility or
disutility?
The second point is how revealed preference, which is based on
predicted utility, deviates from any other measure of utility. At one level the
distinction is easily understood. There is a difference between acquiring
something and having something. °1 For example, someone may be elated
on the day a new car is acquired, but perhaps the more relevant utility is that
associated with having and keeping the car.
The third and most startling point is how often people are inaccurate
when reporting on the impact an event had on them at the time. For
example, in one experiment people were asked to put a hand in very cold
water for a short period of time and then for a longer period of time. 0 2 The
temperature of the water was equal, except in the longer experiment it was
raised slightly near the end of the time period.'0 3 The subjects recorded the
level of discomfort during the experiment.1°4 Later they were asked which
of the two variations of the exercise they would be more willing to repeat. A
majority chose the longer emersion. °5 In other words, they chose the
alternative that was experienced, at the time, as being more unpleasant.
There are actually two factors that disconnect experience from what is
remembered and then from future actions based on the same experience.
The first is "duration neglect" which is the tendency to ignore the duration of
the experience. 10 6 Another is to recall the event with respect to what is
called the "peak-end average." "Peak-end average" is the average of the
101. See Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 150 J. INSTITUTIONAL
& THEORETICAL ECON. 18 (1994).
102. Kahneman, supra note 31, at 386.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 381.
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intensity of feeling at the peak moment and the intensity at the end.'°7 For
example, in the longer version of the water experiment, the last period was
less uncomfortable than the peak period. The average of these two tended to
be more influential than a much shorter period of discomfort that did not
have a period of reduced discomfort.
A similar study goes directly to the question, Do people accurately
predict at the time of revealing their preferences what will actually make
them happier? 0 8 Here subjects were given a sample of yogurt and asked to
predict how much they would like a full serving the next day and for eight
consecutive days. 09 In general, they over-predicted how much they would
like the first serving and then under-predicted how much they would like the
servings on the subsequent days."0 In short, the initial serving was not as
satisfying as predicted, but the ones thereafter were more satisfying. In a
similar study involving ice cream, subjects also tended to predict their
enjoyment for the ice cream would decline."' The actual level of the
decline tended to be lower than that predicted." 2 Most surprising is that the
ability of subjects to predict their actual enjoyment of the ice cream was no
more accurate than those made by a random stranger. 113
What the studies and possibilities underscore is the limited usefulness of
relying on demonstrated preferences as a gauge for utility or happiness.
Consider dining out. There may be considerable utility generated simply by
looking forward to a pleasant dinner. Eating the meal may also be
pleasurable, although almost certainly more so at the outset than later in the
meal. At the end of the experience one may look back on the meal. Upon
reflection, it may have been better or worse than anticipated. Plus, the very
process of recalling may itself be utility-producing. An hour later one may
be uncomfortably full. And the next morning, when stepping on the scale,
the response may be "never again." Eventually a decision about dining out
will be made again. Of all the utilities--experienced or a variety of recalled
-Which governs the decision? And, perhaps as important, Which should
govern decision making? If this is not complicated enough, it is useful to
recall that set point theory holds that regardless of what happens, people tend
107. Id.
108. Daniel Kahneman & Jackie Snell, Predicting a Changing Taste: Do People Know What They
Will Like?, 5 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 187, 189 (1992).
109. Id. at 194.
110. Id. at 195-96.
111. Id. at 191-92.
112. Id. at 192.
113. Id.
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to be hardwired to return to a set level of happiness. In effect, some people
tend to be happy, others tend to be unhappy, and this is genetically
determined. 4
E. Capability Issues and Trusting Happiness
The distinction between feeling and being better off is at the heart of
work done by Amartya Sen with respect to capability." 5 In effect, for want
of a better term, there is a "thinness" to feeling happy or better off.116 As
John Lennon once wrote, drugs, religion, and television can produce the
same result.'1 7 Sen's more scholarly exposition focuses on the link between
having possessions and feeling or being better off. For example, thirty
different people may own bicycles that are exactly the same. Each bicycle
has the potential to be used in different ways-transportation to work or
school, touring, exercise, etc. Obviously, simply knowing how many
bicycles exist (or the "wealth" of the group) tells us little about the overall
happiness.
The problem is that we cannot know much about the utility produced by
the bicycles without knowing about the functionings or capabilities of the
individuals possessing them. They may be possessed by disabled or able-
bodied people. Even among the able-bodied who use the bicycles regularly,
some may greatly enjoy the feeling of movement and the wind blowing
through their hair. Others may use the bikes only as a means of going to and
from work and receive little additional pleasure.
What accounts for these differences? The variation in feelings may be a
function of their expectations. The person who loves biking may have only
experienced life without a means of transportation while the person who can
114. See Lykken & Tellgen, supra note 63. For an expression of this possibility in a context of
particular interest to legal scholars, see Letter from Benjamin Cardozo to Elvira Stolis (Feb. 15,
1933) (on file at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Chutick Law Library), quoted in Martin
E.P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 33, 33 (2001).
115. See SEN, supra note 26; see also AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT
353-69 (1982). The same themes have been advanced by Martha Nussbaum. For a collection of
readings edited by and written by Professors Sen and Nussbaum, see THE QUALITY OF LIFE (Martha
C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). See also David A. Crocker, Functioning and Capability:
The Foundations of Sen's and Nussbaum's Development Ethic, 20 POL. THEORY 584 (1992); Martha
C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: "Perception" Against Lofty Formalism,
121 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2007).
116. There is a very moving line in the film Tender Mercies in which actor Robert Duvall, as Mac
Sledge, says, "I don't trust happiness. I never did, I never will." TENDER MERCIES (Universal
Pictures 1983). This gives one the sense that happiness can be both temporary and resting on a
shaky foundation.
117. For example, "[They] keep you doped with religion and sex and TV." JOHN LENNON,
Working Class Hero, on PLASTIC ONO BAND (Apple/EMI 1970).
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take it or leave it may have access to an expensive sports car. Sen captures
the contingent element in the valuation by noting:
The hopeless beggar, the precarious landless labourer ... or the
over-exhausted coolie may all take pleasures in small mercies, and
manage to suppress intense suffering for the necessity of continuing
survival, but it would be ethically deeply mistaken to attach
correspondingly small value to the loss of their well-being because
of this survival strategy.118
In effect, commodities and utility are linked by both capability and
valuation processes. 1 9
This gap between resources and utility is especially important to those
who are squeamish about applying law to achieve efficiency. If one takes a
wealth maximization approach, it is comparable to adding up the number of
bicycles without proper consideration of the actual pleasure delivered by the
bicycles. As already noted, this is hardly a measure of utility. Alternatively,
if one focuses on utility alone, allocations would be to those who currently
possess the greatest capability of generating utility. The implication that
should concern even the most ardent utilitarian is that without proper
attention to capability and valuation, huge amounts of potential utility are
not realized."0
V. FROM OUTCOME TO PROCESS
A. The Decision Maker as Producer
The problems inherent in using revealed preferences as a link to
efficiency are obvious. Choices do not indicate outcomes. Unfortunately, as
the preceding suggests, focusing on happiness is far from a perfect solution
118. AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS & EcoNoMIcs 45-46 (1987).
119. In some respects, one may argue that a wealth maximization approach remedies the problem
because people with low capabilities will attribute low value to items they cannot make use of.
There are two problems with this. First, wealth maximization is, as discussed earlier, a very
imprecise and misleading measure of utility or even well-being. Second, capability is usually not
defined in terms of one specific commodity. Capability is more usefully concerned with broad
attributes like health, education, etc.
120. Another implication for those who view rights as having an importance independent of utility
is that addressing capability issues broadens freedom whether those freedoms are then employed to
maximize personal self-interest. After all, if the only question were to maximize utility, or even
wealth, the proper route to take may be to drug some people.
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to that disconnect. For example, the way people feel may involve a fair
amount of ignorance with respect to actual well-being. At the same time,
actual well-being may result in a broad range of senses of subjective well-
being-five people who are objectively the same may experience five levels
of happiness. Plus, the time at which feelings of happiness are assessed can
produce different outcomes. In addition, there are great differences in
people's abilities to achieve happiness due to talent limitations, resource
limitations, or just psychological factors. Efforts to refine the analysis by
focusing on one problem are likely to exacerbate others.
Themes do emerge, however, with respect to factors that define a
comprehensive and legally practical notion of efficiency. Principal among
these are information problems. For example, in the context of revealed
preferences and perhaps as the most extreme example of a transaction cost,
today's decision maker is unable to appreciate how a choice will actually
turn out. Moreover, there may be no standard measure of what it means to
"turn out." Does it mean while experiencing the choice or reflecting on that
choice? Information also comes into play when one's sense of well-being is
based on ignorance as to the possibilities. Thus, the sense of well-being of
those who are relatively deprived and do not realize it may be no more a
legally legitimate sense of well-being than that experienced by a drug addict.
The second theme is related to what one might call "producer"
problems. Here the producer is the individual, and the output is happiness.
Production is limited by capabilities. In effect, resources that people are not
capable of using and for whom the use produces little happiness are not, in
fact, all that useful. Under this formulation, the focus is not on "production"
but on the producer. Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum describe it as
involving "an account of the many different kinds of activity that actually
make up a 'thriving' human life."
12
'
Information and capability matters have a common characteristic. They
are not end result measures of efficiency. Instead, they are facilitators of
autonomous decision making. By emphasizing factors that allow freedom
in decision making, the focus is taken from "outcome" to "process." This is
important. In the context of indeterminate measures of utility, the best one
can achieve is a state in which individuals are equipped to make the choices
that they-with full awareness-believe will make them better off.
Providing for this type of decision making has the potential of narrowing the
difference between choice on one hand and both feeling and being better off
on the other.
This shift in focus from output to process can be understood by
reference to a standard application of economics to law-the "efficient
121. Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen, Introduction to THE QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 115,
at 1,2.
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breach." Although subject to criticism, the basic idea is that the remedy for
breach of contract should be set to protect the expectancy of the non-
breaching party. A party will then breach if an opportunity presents itself
that permits the breaching party to pay the expectancy of the non-breaching
party and still be better off. The ultimate outcome supposedly means no one
is worse off and at least one party (and probably two) is better off from a
wealth-maximizing perspective.
Aside from the fact that it is doubtful that many decisions to breach are
based on this analysis, consider how far it is from any measure of well-
being. Nothing about the efficient breach means that those who "gain" or
"lose" are better off in either a subjective or objective sense. The income
itself is only a means to an end, and the way it is used may be disappointing
or highly satisfying. Moreover, "better off' does not mean as well off as
possible. The winner in the efficient breach analysis may look back years
later and regret how the surplus was spent. Even more pointedly, the person
may regret being the type of person who breaks promises for money. These
outcomes are difficult to predict such that it may not make sense to study
them closely. What is more important and more useful to assess is the
process involved in the decision to breach.
122
More generally, the importance of information and the capability of the
producer can be illustrated by reference to money itself. An Economics 101
tenet is that money is strictly a means to an end. It is a medium of exchange
and a way to store value. On its own it provides no sustenance. The same is
true with respect to goods and services. It is the processing or how they are
used that determines their impact. Even food is worthless to the person
whose digestive system is unable to effectively process it. At the other end
of the spectrum, ownership of a work of art may be without consequence if
the owner is unable to appreciate it.
122. Another law and economics standard is allocation of the risk of a harm to the party best able
to avoid the harm. "Best able" in this context means at the lowest cost. Thus, suppose the cost to a
small grocery store owner of constant vigilance designed to keep floors completely dry is $3000 per
year. The expected cost of harm from slips caused by slippery floor is $2000. If the grocery store
owner is found not to be negligent when a shopper slips, What does it really mean? The grocery
store owner may or may not become subjectively better off or objectively better off due to higher
profit resulting from avoiding the $3000 expense. If the owner expects not to be negligent, then the
outcome does not increase anything. It is a loss avoided that the owner never expected to lose. The
actual outcome will depend on information and capability. In short, the increase in wealth and its
distribution are only relevant with respect to improving conditions of individuals who are capable of
making the best use of these resources.
Emphasis on process and the decision point is hardly a new idea. For
example, Seneca, writing about a happy life, stresses wisdom and virtue.'23
"Wisdom is the right understanding; a faculty of discerning good from evil;
what is to be chosen, and what rejected .... ,,124 More modem research
indicates that an important element in determining happiness is a sense of
control. 125  In short, in both cases the emphasis is not on outcome but
process. Even Sen's theory of capability has at its center the idea of control.
How can law be fashioned to place an emphasis on process? In particular,
How can law be applied to enhance the decision making of individuals?
Before considering this question below, it may be important to address
three points. First, Is an approach that puts end results aside and focuses on
function an economic approach at all? In the context of this discussion, it
will be so labeled although the label itself is irrelevant. It is related to an
economic approach much as planners and engineers strive to make the
production process of a factory work seamlessly to achieve the best
outcomes with limited waste and down time.
Second, it may seem odd to view decisional equity as an economic
matter. Equity, a normative matter, is usually not the province of
economics. Here, however, "equity" refers to the fairness inherent in each
person having an opportunity to make the best decisions. Note that this is
not equality. Enabling all people to make qualitatively equal decisions is
likely to be impossible. The objective is to create the best chance-which
will vary from person to person-to make the best possible decisions.
The third question is to what extent the decision-making process of
individuals can be the sole focus of law. This depends a bit on what is
meant by law. For example, Congress can pass a law that ensures access to
health care by all, which almost certainly improves well-being and may
make individuals better decision makers. In the context of the proposal
presented here, however, law is taken to mean the principles and regulations
governing conduct. In the context of this definition, law has many "duties"
including avoiding injustice, providing incentives and deterrence, as the case
may be, and rationalizing industries. Some but not all of these can be
included in a focus on decision making. For example, even criminal law, to
the extent that it has the impact of preference-shaping, 126 as opposed to
123. James J. Walsh, Buridan and Seneca, 27 J. HIST. IDEAS 23, 30 (1966). Interestingly, Seneca
is also responsible for the following oft-quoted proposition: "If you want to make a [man] rich, do
not add to his possessions but subtract from his desire." Norman W. Dewitt, Epicirian Doctrine in
Horace, 34 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 127, 133 (1939).
124. ROGER L'ESTRANGE, SENECA'S MORALS BY WAY OF ABSTRACT 76 (1879).
125. See GILBERT, supra note 4, at 21-23; Frey & Stutzer, supra note 4, at 51; Dan Ariely,
Controlling the Information Flow: Effects on Consumers' Decision Making and Preferences, 27 J.
CONSUMER RES. 233 (2000) (discussing the impact of control on information itself).
126. See Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-
Shaping Policy, 39 DUKE L.J. 1 (1990).
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simply punishing, can arguably improve decision making. In contract law,
the case has been made that increased use of the unconscionability doctrine
can have a therapeutic and empowering impact on those who are taken
advantage of.'27 Still, it seems clear that economic considerations cannot be
the sole focus of law.
B. Decisional Equity and Its Components
This leads to a more precise description of decisional equity. The
standards are by necessity somewhat elastic, but they also have an intuitive
appeal. Three rules are the anchors of such an approach:
1. The Informational Ideal: Individual decision making should be
made in the context of the most relevant information that can
practically be made available. This information should include
expected outcomes and opportunity costs.
2. The Physic Ideal: Decisions should be relatively unaffected by
desire and cognitive bias.
3. The Social Ideal: Decisions should not be influenced by adaptation
to perceived injustice.
The implications of each of these for the effectively processing person
are fairly obvious. Together they achieve greater equity in decision making
but, it is important to note, not equality of outcomes. This is in part because
there is nothing particularly just about equal outcomes. In addition, as the
first part of this article indicates, a determination of what it means to have an
equal outcome is impossible. Finally, an equality of outcome approach is
likely to be excessively intrusive.
The approach here is in the tradition of those who have attempted to
express various equalitarian ideals,'28 whether they are in terms of welfare,
129
resources, 30 primary goods,'3 1 or capability. 13 2  It is influenced by the
writings of Amartya Sen and John Rawls but different in many critical
respects. Sen's notion of capability calls for much broader action than law,
127. See Harrison, supra note 82.
128. For a good summary, see Norman Daniels, Equality of What: Welfare, Resources or
Capabilities, 50 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 273 (1990).
129. See, e.g., Richard Ameson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77
(1988).
130. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 283 (1981).
131. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 115-120 (discussing the views of Amartya Sen).
as defined above, can facilitate. For example, capability, in Sen's view,
extends to general well-being including matters of physical health and
longevity. 33  Indeed, capability issues are akin to macroeconomic
adjustments. One might view the capability approach as an effort to define
an ideal economic system. Decisional equity on the other hand focuses on
just that-fully informed decision making free of the fog of social and
psychological influences. To a much greater extent than Sen, however, it
leaves people as it finds them. Not that this is necessarily a desired goal in
the long run, but Sen's broader goals lie outside the province of law as
defined above. 1
34
Similarly, the approach here is more modest than that of Rawls.
135
Certainly equity in decision making could be a part of obtaining both liberty
principle 136  and difference principle 37  goals, but not necessarily.
Nevertheless, decisional equity does not guarantee equal liberty of outcomes
that favor those better off only when those worse off are also favored. In
fact, to some extent the outcome-oriented approach of the difference
principle encounters the same issues as conventional efficiency standards.
The central tenet of decisional equity is to limit the effects of
information imbalances, reasoning biases, and social class. In many
respects, limiting these influences increases personal autonomy by
permitting the expression of true or more accurate preferences. Ironically,
the approach allows people to reveal their preferences as conventional
economics would have it but only when those preferences are free of the
variety of factors that often separate choice from actual welfare, happiness,
or desires. More specifically, the approach should appeal even to those who
continue to adhere to "revealed preference" as a means of assessing utility-
increasing choices.
Since these choices are very often revealed in the context of contract
formation, much of the following analysis will be expressed in that context.
In reality, choice making far exceeds contract making. For example, the
133. See SEN, supra note 26, at 10, 45.
134. The difficulties of operationalizing Sen's capability approach have been noted. See Antonio
D'Agata, Endogenizing Sen's Capabilities: An Adaptive Dynamic Analysis, 36 J. SOClO-EcONOMIcs
177 (2007); Simon Bambeck, Freedom and Capacity: Implications ofSen's Capability Approach for
Berlin's Negative Freedom, I RERUM CAUSAE 10 (2006); Charles Gore, Irreducibly Social Goods
and the Informational Basis of Amartya Sen's Capability Approach, 9 J. INT'L DEV. 235 (1997);
Flavio Comin, Operationalizing Sen's Capability Approach (June 2001) (unpublished paper, on file
with author).
135. See RAWLS, supra note 131.
136. The Liberty Principle states that "[elach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all." Id. at 250.
137. The Difference Principle states that "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to
positions and offices open to all." Id. at 60.
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decision to exercise, drive carefully, have children, or postpone present
consumption are all affected by the three rules of decisional equity expressed
here.
It would be incorrect to infer that decisional equity requires harnessing
an entirely novel set of legal theories and tools. In fact, the field of
therapeutic jurisprudence,1 38 although not expressly so, is closely related to
decisional equity and the discussion that follows. Therapeutic jurisprudence
is devoted to the question of how law can have an impact on the
"psychological or physical well-being of the people it affects.' ' 9 On the
other hand, it would be idealistic to assume standard legal tools alone can
achieve decisional equity. Given the fact that the same tools and the
institutions employing them have a variety of other demands, the best that
can be achieved might be termed "workable decisional equity."
1. The Information Ideal
The information ideal is a broad concept. It includes ordinary
information like product quality but extends to information about the long-
term effects of decisions and includes opportunity costs. 140 It can be broken
into two subtopics. First, at a very practical level, Are the basic rules of
required disclosure consistent with decisional equity? Second, Can an
understanding of non-functional factors that influence choices be increased
and the impact of those influences reduced where appropriate? In both of
these cases, the goal is to match revealed preferences with actual outcomes.
a. Transactional Information: The Issue of Disclosure
One of the important areas of contract law deals with disclosure and
misrepresentation. Its tenets have even broader applications. Perhaps the
standard that holds the greatest likelihood of enhancing decisional equity is
something akin to a golden rule of information exchange. Under this
standard, any party to an exchange would be required to reveal any
information that the party would like to know if in the position of the other
party. This would cover both instances of unilateral mistake and failure to
138. See generally LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE, xvii-xx (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996).
139. Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, in LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 138, at 763, 775.
140. An opportunity cost is the value of the next best choice when one makes a decision.
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disclose.1 41 Obviously this is not the law. Instead, some fairly general rules
are well-established. Fraud and material misrepresentation are grounds for
one party to avoid a contract or to collect for breach of contract the
difference between the value of what was promised and the value of what
was received. 142 Moreover, as a general matter, one party is not required to
disclose information to another party unless the non-disclosure would be
tantamount to a misrepresentation. Under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 43 this duty to disclose arises in four cases, the most relevant for
the purposes at hand being when the disclosure "would correct a
mistake ... and if non-disclosure ... amounts to a failure to act in good faith
and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing."' 144 In the case
of unilateral mistake, the mistaken party is excused when that party did not
assume the risk of the mistake and the other party knew or had reason to
know of the mistake.
There are, of course, a great number of statutory disclosure
requirements, ranging from warning labels on toys and medications to loan
terms and the nutritional content of foods. Clearly these requirements assist
in creating greater decisional equity. They are required because there is little
indication that the market would produce the information otherwise. Either
it is not in the interest of suppliers to disclose certain product characteristics
or free-riding problems lead to under-production.
The principal argument against "full disclosure" in the context of an
individual exchange is that it creates a disincentive to invest in generating or
discovering information. Anthony Kronman's seminal article on the issue
notes that the ability to exploit information leads to additional
information. 145  Consequently, the rule against automatically requiring
disclosure is arguably efficient. According to Professor Kronman, this is
consistent with the rule requiring a party to intervene in the case of unilateral
mistake because the type of information likely to be involved in those
instances is unlikely to be subject to a disincentive. 46  In a sense, the
141. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts separates these topics. Under section 153, a contract
is voidable by a unilaterally mistaken party when he does not assume the risk of the mistake and the
other party has reason to know of the mistake. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153
(1981). Under section 161, a failure to disclose information is treated as a misrepresentation under
certain conditions. Id. at § 161. Aside from the remedial differences, it is not clear that the
distinction is otherwise useful.
142. Of course, fraud also gives rise to an action under tort law.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981).
144. Id. at § 161(b). The other situations involve ones in which 1) the disclosure would correct a
prior misleading statement, 2) the mistake goes to the content of a writing, and 3) there exists a
relationship between the parties that would lead one to expect disclosure. See id. at § 161(a), (c),
(d).
145. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978).
146. Professor Kronman sees these cases as analogous to the tort doctrine of "last clear chance."
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analysis is like that applied in the context of intellectual property: the ability
to internalize the benefits of one's inventive or creative efforts means more
production. While this analysis probably holds as a general matter with
respect to intellectual property and is clearly the underpinning of American
intellectual property law, the analysis is not sufficiently nuanced to apply to
the ordinary exchange. 147
To understand the complexity it is useful to think of information as
existing along two different continuums. First, as Professor Kronman points
out, there is information that is deliberately sought and there is information
that is obtained casually. 148 Thus, at one end there might be an art historian
who studies for years in order to be able to spot the early and unrecognized
works of great artists at auctions. Once found, the works are sold to
museums for all to enjoy. This can be contrasted with the person who has
no training in art but overhears someone at the same auction say, "That
could very well be a Picasso," but pays a price that is not enhanced in any
way. In the first case, so the argument goes, disclosure could discourage the
search for important but mislaid works of art.
The deliberate-casual distinction is but one part of the analysis. The use
of unilaterally held information can have primarily allocative or primarily
distributive effects. This too can form a continuum. For example, the art
finder's actions, described above, can be seen as having what are ultimately
allocative effects-increased pleasure for those seeing the previously lost
works of art. On the other hand, consider this example that is based on the
personal experience of those who have undergone training as door-to-door
encyclopedia peddlers. Part of that training involves knowing just how to
hand a sample volume to a prospective customer. The "appropriate"
technique is to keep the book just beyond the customer's reach so that the
customer can only grasp the edge. What is conveyed by this approach is that
the books are heavy, well-made, or substantial. The information about how
to hand the book to someone is the result of research, like that of the art
finder, designed to increase the wealth or well-being of the researcher. Of
course the difference is that the art finder may make others better off too-
The party seeking to be excused has made a mistake, but there is little or no cost to the mistaken
party to correct the mistake. Id. at 8.
147. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law: Theory and
Application, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3-4 (2005).
148. Kronman, supra note 145, at 13. According to Professor Kronman, the duty to intervene in
the case of unilateral mistake that is absent in the disclosure cases can be reconciled by the fact that
the information in the unilateral mistake instance is rarely obtained through a deliberate search. Id.
at 13-14.
an allocative effect-while the sole goal of the book seller is to sell the
encyclopedia at the highest possible price. The objective is purely
distributive. Efforts that alter only distributive outcomes are viewed by most
economists as economic waste. They do not increase total well-being, they
just redistribute it. The analysis can be visualized in Figure 2.
Figure 2
In the context of Professor Kronman's analysis, all information,
regardless of the purpose, that is acquired casually should be disclosed. This
information will be forthcoming without an incentive. Similarly, all
information that is used primarily to facilitate a redistribution from one party
should be disclosed. With no reward available to those to study things like
how to make a book seem weightier than it is, this type of information is far
less likely to be developed. The quadrant of the grid that raises the strongest
case for not requiring disclosure is on the upper right, describing deliberately
acquired information having an allocative impact.
49
Even focusing on this best case argument for non-disclosure, the
efficiency argument is a very thin one. The first point to be made here is
that any efficiency associated with the rule stems from ignorance of the rule
or at least of its breadth. To understand this, consider the classic case
149. Professor Kronman treats both the issues of unilateral mistake and disclosure. He concludes
that a rule requiring a party to correct the mistake of another party if the first party knows about the
mistake is unlikely to have undesired consequences because the relevant information is unlikely to
be the result of a deliberate effort to gather information. See id. at 7.
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Laidlaw v. Organ. 50 Organ purchased tobacco from Laidlaw knowing that
the value had suddenly increased because of the end of the War of 1812.' 5
Laidlaw did not know the war had ended. 5 2 The Supreme Court eventually
ruled that Organ had no duty to disclose.'53 In the context of the case, it is
not clear if the information was deliberately acquired, how much of an
investment was made to acquire it, or whether there was any allocative
advantage associated with one tobacco dealer enjoying a few hours jump on
another.
But, suppose all of these things were true. That is, Organ invested in
acquiring the information and, by virtue of the bargain, otherwise delayed
information would reach the market and would affect the planting decisions
of growers. This would put him squarely in the upper right quadrant. Note
that even if that were all true, had Laidlaw asked "Do you know of
something that affects the value of the tobacco?" a negative answer would
constitute fraud. 54 In other words, the legal right not to disclose seems to
hinge on whether one party asks the other party whether such information
exists.
To understand the importance of this, go back to the hypothetical art
finder, this time making the rounds of yard sales. Suppose one seller asks,
"Do you have any knowledge of what this painting may be?" and another
does not. In the first case the buyer must disclose and in the second case,
under the conventional standard, disclosure is not required. What would
account for one party asking and another not asking? There are a couple of
possibilities. One possibility is that not asking is a form of competition.'55
That is, bargain hunters may prefer shopping in contexts in which they will
not be asked questions about what they know.
The more likely reason is that the second seller does not think to ask.
The assumption would follow from a belief that the buyer is not required to
give a truthful answer. In this case, disclosure or non-disclosure has nothing
to do with exclusive information but a likely misunderstanding of legal
obligations. 5 6 Needless to say, an argument that a specific legal rule is
150. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
151. Id. at 183.
152. Id. Evidently the question was asked but it is not clear what the answer was. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Kronman, supra note 145, at 10 n.27.
155. Presumably non-askers would adjust their asking or offering prices accordingly.
156. Professor Kronman suggests that even silence after such a question may be fraudulent. See
Kronman, supra note 145, at 10 n.27. It seems likely that the buyer who silently walks away has not
committed a fraud. It is not clear why a seller would accept silence after such a critical question.
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efficient only because it is ultimately misunderstood is hardly compelling.
The weakness of the idea that non-disclosure is a "right" in the case of
unilaterally held information can be understood by comparing it to other
rights. 5 7 Certainly the "owner" of land or any other property who must
relinquish it when asked for it would not regard herself as the owner of
much at all. In effect, this is the reality with information held by one party
whether casually or deliberately acquired.
A second point with respect to the thinness of the rule allowing non-
disclosure requires understanding that the decision to allow a party to
internalize the gains from deliberately obtained allocatively beneficial
information does not necessarily mean that all of the gains need to be
internalized for the information to be discovered or developed. Again,
returning to the case of the art finder, the proper question is-What is the
minimum level of internalization that would give rise to the allocative
benefits? For example, the art expert finds a misplaced Picasso worth
$5,000,000 for sale at a yard sale for $15 and buys the painting for that
amount. It is not at all clear that art finders who do not disclose are entitled
to the entire profit associated with their research.
58
Those with an interest in intellectual property will recognize these issues
as similar to the ones raised in that context. Patents and copyrights are for
limited times. Since American copyright and patent law exists for the
benefit of the public with the creative people as a means to an end, 59 the
question is how much incentive is necessary to draw forth the efforts of
inventors and artists. By limiting the duration of intellectual property rights
and the scope of protection, the theory is that not all of the benefits
associated with these efforts must be internalized for the efforts to be made.
Both because the property right to unilaterally held information is thin,
if close to nonexistent, and because full internalization of the full benefits is
very likely not necessary, the cost of decisional equity is actually quite
low. 60 In theory and perhaps no more than in theory, decisional equity
requires a series of decisions. First, Was the information deliberately or
casually obtained? Second, Was the information used by the possessor of
the information primarily for distributive or allocative purposes? Finally, if
the information was deliberately sought and was allocatively valuable, Is it
necessary for the possessor to internalize all the benefits in order for the
information to be used effectively?
157. Id. at 15.
158. The analysis changes if the art expert is speculating and buys art on the chance that it may
turn out to be valuable.
159. One of the broadest statements of this is found in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156(1975).
160. It is useful to note that the argument against a "golden rule" of information hinges on
efficiency-a concept that, as explained in the early part of this article, is very inexact.
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Intellectual property law resolves these issues with largely politically
determined standards' 6' that seem to have little connection with encouraging
the most desired levels of innovation and creativity. 62 Still, at least there are
relatively bright lines on which one can rely. In the context of unilaterally
held information, the analysis is not so simple. From a practical perspective,
a limited right not to disclose means determining how much information the
knowledgeable party must disclose. Even an imperfect bright line test like
that found in the context of intellectual property is difficult to design. 163 The
argument may be made that the administrative costs of making such a fine
distinction outweigh any benefits. 64 This point does not, however, lead to
one rule or the other-it is just as applicable to an argument for full
disclosure as it is to an argument for no disclosure.
The reality is that the costs of fine-tuning are likely too high and that the
better per se rule is the (golden) rule of full disclosure. The full disclosure
rule covers all contexts including those of casually obtained information plus
those of information used for distributive purposes only. If it is over-
inclusive, it is because it picks up some instances in which non-disclosure
discourages some useful research. Still, even here, the right it protects is one
that exists because of the ignorance of parties that, if they ask for the
information, it must be disclosed. Moreover, a rule of non-disclosure is also
over-inclusive. It may protect some research that leads to allocative gains
but only at the cost of unproductive redistributive efforts and the protection
of information that was casually gained. 1
65
161. For example, in 1998 the copyright term was extended from life plus fifty years to life plus
seventy years not just for post-1998 work but for works already in existence. See Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003). The extension has been referred to as the "Mickey Mouse Act" because the
effect was to prevent some Disney characters from falling into the public domain.
162. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright,
32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 853 (2004).
163. There are two issues that would have to be addressed. One is to separate the cost of
deliberately acquired allocatively beneficial information from all other cases. This determination
leads to the second problem. Should the knowledgeable party be permitted to retain all of the gain
from the exchange? This gets particularly sticky. For example, in the case of the art hunter who
finds the $5,000,000 Picasso marked $15 at a yard sale it seems impractical for the buyer to offer,
say, $500,000. This requires the buyer to indirectly disclose and may mean the seller simply shops
for the highest bidder and removes virtually all gain to the buyer. Any offer above the asking price
will in many instances have the same effect.
164. Kronman, supra note 145, at 17-18.
165. It is important to note in this context that research designed to facilitate only redistributions
are, to economists, misallocations. In other words, they are an allocative loss to be compared with
whatever allocative gains result from information in the upper right quadrant.
b. The Challenge of Non-Functional and Created Expectations
One of the more puzzling problems in the context of an analysis of
decisional equity is what to make of and how to treat non-functional appeals.
"Non-functional" denotes information that appeals to emotion, whim, vanity,
status, or anything else unrelated to what the product or service actually
does. 1 66 Non-functional information is treated here as something different
from information or the presentation of information, the success of which
depends on decision-making biases that have been discussed over the last
twenty-five years by behavioral economists and others studying cognitive
biases.167
Obviously, the potential for this use of information depends on the
product. Not many screwdrivers are promoted as making the buyer younger
or more attractive. On the other hand, many automobile advertisements
clearly appeal to the type of image the driver would like to project. Two
problems emerge. First, What if the information itself, albeit non-functional
in some sense, actually leads to greater subjective well-being? Second, To
what extent are people to be excused from their own unwillingness to
examine the assertions of others more closely?
The complexity of the issue for a theory of decisional equity can be
understood by reference to a recent experiment. Subjects were served wines
that they were told were very different in terms of price.' 68 In fact the wines
were the same. 169 Not only did the subjects claim to prefer the higher priced
wine, brain scans suggested that they actually experienced greater
satisfaction from that wine. 70 It seems unlikely that such results are isolated
to wine. For example, beer commercials may actually increase a person's
sense of social happiness the next time that person consumes the beer. An
automobile commercial showing an attractive person asserting independence
while driving a convertible may make the positive feelings more pronounced
when the buyer drives the car.
There are a couple of reactions to this. The first might be to ban non-
functional advertising. Not only would this lead to serious First Amendment
issues, but it too quickly classifies the non-functional as something to be
avoided. 171 Is there a principled distinction between owning and using a
166. A product could, however, have an aesthetic appeal.
167. See infra Part V.B.2.b.
168. See Hilke Plassmann et al., Marketing Actions Can Modulate Neural Representations of
Experienced Pleasantness, 105 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCd. 1050, 1050 (2008).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1050-51.
171. On the other hand, there seems to be little reason for public subsidization of arguably non-
functional qualities. This is, however, the direction trademark law has taken. As one court has put
it: "[A] loss occurs when a sophisticated buyer purchases a knockoff and passes it off to the public as
the genuine article, thereby confusing the viewing public and achieving the status of owning the
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stapler and feeling pleasure each time it reliably operates and driving a
convertible that creates pleasant associations with being young, attractive,
and free? More importantly, By what standard would the "worth" of one
type of pleasure be ranked ahead of another? The fact is that the information
itself may give rise to the pleasure.
The important step in the context of decisional equity is to avoid this
debate. The temptation to be pulled into it is captured nicely by the authors
of the wine study when they write:
[O]ur results have implications for economics. [Experienced
pleasantness] is an important component of experienced utility,
which is the economist's term for subjective well being. We show
that, contrary to the standard economic view, [experienced
pleasantness] depends on nonintrinsic properties, such as the price
at which they are sold. It then follows that marketing manipulations
might affect subjective perceptions of well being. This raises
several difficult questions for the field. Should the effect of prices
on experienced utility be counted as real economic well being or as
a mistake made by individuals?
72
Note that the authors' statement of the problem follows the traditional
path. The question is, in essence, Should this be counted as an output? This
just leads to a string of imponderables. Does Prozac increase well-being or
just a sense of well-being by changing the way various brain functions
operate? Are people actually better off when they do not know of an
impending illness? The point is, as illustrated throughout this Article, that
the output assessment is a trap of circular reasoning, arguments and
counterarguments, and indeterminacy.
In fact, non-functional information is only a problem if it clouds the
decision-making process itself by generating false expectations. In the
context of the wine example, the problem is not that a person enjoys the
$100 wine more than the identical $20 wine but that the pricing may create
false expectations about future purchases. In short, the focus of decisional
equity is not on what should be counted as utility or happiness but on
whether the information has the potential to mislead or to convince a buyer
genuine article at a knockoff price." Hermes Int'l. v. Lederer De Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d
104, 109 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). See also generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trademark Law
and Status Signaling: Tattoos for the Privileged, 59 FLA. L. REv. 195 (2007); Richard S. Higgins &
Paul H. Rubin, Counterfeit Goods, 29 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1986).
172. See Plassmann et al., supra note 168, at 1052.
that certain results will or will not occur when the seller has no good faith
belief that those results actually will occur.
The second problem concerns personal autonomy and ensuring that
decisional equity does not intrude on that autonomy. Decisional equity
means that a person with unrealistic expectations should not be permitted to
recover. A case that illustrates the difficulty of this distinction is the famous
dance lesson case, Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc.,173 in which a fifty-two-
year-old widow, Mrs. Vokes, ends up buying a total of 2,300 hours of dance
lessons at a cost of $3 1,000.174 She was evidently motivated by repeated
assurances that she had "grace and poise" and great potential.'75 In fact, she
did not progress, had little dance aptitude, and even had difficulty "hearing
the musical beat. 176
What makes the case difficult are a series of questions. Did Vokes
really believe she would become an accomplished dancer if, in fact, she
knew she could not hear the beat of the music? Was she actually and
knowingly paying for companionship, or should she have known she was?
Or, on the other hand, Was she unable to think clearly given the barrage of
misleading information that she encountered? Decisional equity does not
assist the person who is willfully ignorant.
One important distinction Vokes suggests is between instances of
changing one's mind and those in which legitimate expectations are not met.
For example, Vokes may have, at some point, just wished she had not spent
so much money on dance lessons. Or, it may be that she realized the
expectations created by the cajoling of the instructors were not likely to be
met. In some sense, the critical concept is whether those expectations were
actually created by others.
Precisely what decisional equity calls for in the context of non-
functional information is difficult to describe. Ideally, people would become
more sophisticated in their evaluation of information. In fact, to some extent
this end has been achieved-it would be surprising if many people took the
suggestions found in television and print advertisements seriously. Still, a
case can be made that greater awareness of these vulnerabilities has a
public-good-like character and that this public effort in raising awareness is
warranted.
The basis for reacting to non-functional information as described here
follows from the general rule that a person who creates a misimpression
must correct it or be viewed as having engaged in a misrepresentation. In
fact, when any product or service is put onto the market and portrayed
173. 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
174. Id. at 908.
175. Id. at 907.
176. Id. at 908.
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exclusively in a positive light, the logic of the misrepresentation rule calls for
a fuller disclosure. 7 7 These disclosures already exist in many areas related
to nutritional information and consumer safety. 178 Plus there is a significant
private market for information pertaining to product quality and durability.
Broader efforts to correct misimpressions in broadcast and print media could
be furthered by requiring that objective consumer product information be
attached to all such ads.' 79 For example, in the case of automobile ads, like
the side effect warnings for prescription drugs, information could be
included about average repair costs, repeat buyers, and average trade-in
values. Airline ads could be accompanied by statistics indicating percentage
of on-time arrivals, average age of fleet, and pilots' years of experience. 80
In fact, the vast amount of information that could be useful to buyers is
either already available to them but involves high transaction costs or is kept
secret by producers. Moreover, non-disclosure of this information is
generally to achieve distributive ends,' 8' the fear being that the information
would render the market more competitive or diminish the value of the
product.
The argument is more compelling when one considers why broader
disclosure is not already the norm. It cannot be that consumers have no right
to the information. After all, the logic of misrepresentation by silence seems
to extend equally to non-functional information. Otherwise one is in the
awkward position of arguing, for example, that airline passengers have no
right to know the age of a particular aircraft even though airlines routinely
stress safety, albeit in somewhat subtle ways. The lack of greater disclosure
seems to be a function of market power. Sellers reveal as little as possible
about the downside of a purchase because buyers are unable to locate
suppliers who are more forthcoming. Thus, permitting non-disclosure in
177. This seems a logical extension of section 161 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
178. As has been pointed out, the way the information is presented can be as important as its
disclosure. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 14. For example, a generalized statement that
something may be harmful is less effective at overcoming the inherent optimism bias than a warning
that includes an example. Id. at 209-17.
179. For a spirited discussion of whether current disclosure requirements are sufficient as a
response to persistent consumer error, compare Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of
Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REv. 749 (2008), with Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical
Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803 (2008).
180. See United States Bureau of Transportation Services, United States Department of
Transportation, http://www.bts.gov (providing statistical information regarding airlines) (last visited
Apr. 9, 2009).
181. See Bar-Gill, supra note 179, at 780 (making the point that redistributions associated with
non-disclosures may be regressive).
many instances is not only inconsistent with the requirement that parties
correct misimpressions they have created but arises, in part, as a result of
market imperfections that permit the most efficient producers of the
information to conceal it.
2. The Psychic Ideal
a. The Dynamics of Desire
One of the underrepresented elements in any decision making is not just
that individuals become locked into efforts to achieve specific outcomes but
that they do not consider the prospects of not having the desire in the first
place. There is an important distinction here. Presumably when deciding
whether to buy something individuals, perhaps only in a cursory sense,
compare how they will feel with and without, for example, the new car or
vacation. Some informal cost-benefit analysis would seem to be the ideal if
only for its consistency with rationality. One can picture the decision maker
making a list of pros and cons.
Beyond most people's consciousness, there is a third possibility, perhaps
more critical to the information ideal than any other-How would it feel not
to have the desire at all? On a practical level we know it is possible to get
there. People frequently are faced with pressing decisions that months later
they can see from a different perspective that enables them to realize how
little what seemed like a critical decision actually meant. Often times,
hearing about the misfortune of someone else is said to "put things in
perspective." The event allows people to recognize how inconsequential
their own decisions are. In a sense, they see decisions in a broader context
and realize that "in the scheme of things it did not matter at all."
At those moments, individuals are able to separate needs from desires.182
In a general sense, needs are those things one cannot do without. Desires, on
the other hand, may create a tremendous sense of longing, but this
discomfort can be extinguished not only by acquiring or achieving the
subject of that "want" but also by ridding oneself of the desire. 83 There is
obviously a close connection with this view of desire and the Four Noble
Truths of Buddhist thought: 
184
1. Life means suffering.
182. See Harry G. Frankfurt, Necessity and Desire, 45 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 1
(1984).
183. These may also be viewed as "natural" or "empty" desires. Empty desires are "infected with
the falsity of the evaluative beliefs that ground them; and also because they tend to be vain or self-
defeating, reaching out for a 'boundless' object that can yield no stable satisfaction." MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, THE THERAPY OF DESIRE 112 (1994).
184. See Feldman, supra note 73, at 103.
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2. The origin of suffering is attachment.
3. The cessation of suffering is attainable.
4. There is an eight-fold path to the cessation of suffering.
Critical in this analysis is the notion of attachment and suffering.
Attachment in this context means desiring or being "fixed" on things, ideas,
and even self. The connection is fairly obvious. Wanting creates a sense of
not being fulfilled, i.e., suffering. In all likelihood, especially when it comes
to material things, obtaining whatever is giving rise to that suffering
provides only temporary relief. New needs emerge. One can understand
how this happens. The standard example is one in which having bought a
new coat, it becomes evident that one's other clothing is in need of
updating." 5  Or, under set point theory, 8 6 regardless of the happiness or
unhappiness experienced, the person returns to a steady level of contentment
or discontent. What all of this suggests, as noted earlier, is that acquisition is
not the key to happiness. Buddhists have a prescription for relieving the
suffering by eliminating desire.8 7 Without attempting to detail it here or to
describe one particular formula, the key idea is that decisional equity would
include information or knowledge of the possibility of eliminating
unhappiness by diminishing desire.
Other ways to decrease desire involve alterations in perspective. One is
to recognize that all desires beyond the natural are socially determined.
They are, thus, largely fortuitous and random. At their heart is a loss of
personal control. This idea has an important cognitive element because it
requires seeing oneself in a position of control. The different context
strategy also has a temporal element. It is possible to compare current
longings with ones as strongly felt in the past and explore whether
acquisition or non-acquisition made a significant long-term difference. For
example, a person might have a powerful desire for a new car and decide
against buying one. Years later, that person may reflect and decide things
turned out better or that it was silly to have made such a big deal at the time.
Another "perspective" moment can occur when one is face-to-face with
those who have much less or can recall being happier with less. 8 Similarly,
185. One possibility is the "Diderot effect," which means that acquisition of one new thing
actually increases desire as it becomes evident that one's other possessions are not as new or as
fashionable. See JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: WHY WE WANT WHAT WE DON'T
NEED 145-47 (1998).
186. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., THICH NHAT HANH, THE HEART OF BUDDHA'S TEACHING 24-40 (1998).
188. According to one author, people tend to be in a form of denial at the time of a purchase and
then later see themselves as having been foolish. See SCHOR, supra note 185, at 74-84.
if a serious misfortune befalls the person or someone close to that person,
the "little things" seem far less important.
Law for the most part has no way to assist people in achieving an
understanding of the potential of becoming happier by extinguishing desire
in the Buddhist tradition. Perspective-changing, however, as discussed
further below, can be addressed with greater availability of cooling-off
periods. 89 In effect, the difficulty of gaining a fresh perspective is
tantamount to a transaction cost.
b. Decision-Making Biases
Aside from addressing information imbalances and problems of
disclosure, decisional equity requires a response to common decision-
making errors.' 90 These persistent quirks in reasoning have been explored in
a number of scholarly works' 91 and more recently in writings with broader
appeal. 192 All of these quirks, biases, and tendencies, have in common the
fact that they prevent expectations, or at least aspirations, at the time of
decision making from lining up with outcomes. At a very simple level, the
principal reason for this disconnect is that individuals are unable to
experience the outcome until they have made' 93 an often irrevocable choice.
In other instances, they may have experienced the outcome at a prior time
but misremembered it for one reason or another.194
These biases can be seen as analogous to the kinds of imperfections that
give rise in a conventional analysis to transaction costs. 195 Here the term is
189. See generally ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ALLEVIATING MISTAKES: REVERSAL AND
FORGIVENESS FOR FLAWED PERCEPTIONS (2004); Louis E Wolcher, The Accommodation of Regret
in Contract Remedies, 73 IOWA L. REV. 797 (1988).
190. See infra notes 195-199 and accompanying text. The most direct effort to address the issue
of applying law to avoid mistakes before they happen as opposed to responding to poor decisions by
some form of regulation or liability assignment is Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 14. For a broad
examination of judgment "errors," see Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Law's Illusion: Scientific Jurisprudence
and the Struggle with Judgment (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch. Research, Working Paper No. 08-20,
2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid= 163256.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 113-119; see also JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND
ECONOMICS: POSITIVE, NORMATIVE AND BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES 63-140 (2d ed. 2007); Jolls &
Sunstein, supra note 14. A concise recent effort is Blumenthal, supra note 4, at 167-82.
192. An early attempt was RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1992). More recently, economists have hit the jackpot with
layperson explanations of well-known economic phenomena and released three books in the space of
a few months. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE
OUR DECISIONS (2008); TIM HARFORD, THE LOGIC OF LIFE: THE RATIONAL ECONOMICS OF AN
IRRATIONAL WORLD (2008); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISION MAKING FOR HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2008).
193. Conversely, repeated opportunities to make a decision are likely to be informative, leading to
more satisfactory outcomes. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 2, at 1163.
194. See supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
195. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski also uses the term "transaction costs" in the context of legal responses to
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used to mean any factor that separates expectations from what is
experienced.196  In some respects, it may seem awkward to think of
transaction costs in this context, 197 but most if not all of the factors
separating reality from the informational ideal could be overcome by
lowering costs of one kind or another. These costs are ultimately "psychic"
in that they are barriers to more effective reasoning. In fact, the transaction
cost idea can be connected directly to the idea of decisional equity as an end
in itself in a significant way.198  It is important to note what "overcome"
means in this context. It is not a matter of channeling individuals into one
outcome or another. For example, understanding the fundamentals of desire
of Buddhist philosophy does not mean a predetermination of what the person
ought to do. Nor does an understanding of framing effects' 99 mean that a
decision-making biases. Rachlinski, supra note 19, at 1168. His meaning appears to be different,
and I would suggest not entirely consistent with the ordinary usage. Id. He writes:
To be sure, learning to restructure a decision so as to avoid reliance on a misleading
heuristic is costly. In effect, cognitive psychology suggests that this cost is related to the
cognitive difficulty of restructuring the decision making task. This cognitive cost, like a
transaction cost, might support adopting a particular legal rule constraining individual
choice if the cost is high enough or an inexpensive reform reduces the cognitive cost in
some way.
Id. This passage seems to equate transaction costs with the cost of remedying the decision-making
bias. In fact, transaction costs are typically the information and search costs that individual entities
must overcome to achieve optimal outcomes. It is this latter meaning of the term that is employed
here.
196. One component of transaction costs is search costs. For example, an individual shopping for
a new car may travel from dealer to dealer searching for the best price. In fact, the individual may
test drive the car, rent it before committing as a way of experiencing, as accurately as possible, what
it will feel like to own the car. The idea is that, at some point, the transaction costs are high enough
that any advantage found by way of a lower price do not offset those costs.
197. Transaction costs are generally viewed as responsible for blocking the efficient allocation of
resources, and part of the thesis of this article is that the notion of efficiency is not a measure of
actual subjective or objective well-being and that direct measures of happiness are suspect.
Moreover, transaction costs are typically viewed as actual out-of- pocket expenditures.
198. In this sense, what follows can be distinguished from others who have written about
decision-making biases as preventing efficient outcomes. See Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note
19, at 1487.
199. Preference reversals occur when questions are framed differently. A classic example is the
Tversky and Kahneman experiment in which people are asked what is objectively the same question
in two different forms. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981). People are asked to imagine an epidemic in which
600 people are expected to die. They are then given two choices. Under Program A, 200 people
will be saved. Under Program B, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a
two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. Subjects preferred Program A by almost a three-
to-one margin. They were also given these two choices: (1) If Program C is adopted, 400 people
will die; (2) If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-
thirds probability that 600 people will die. Framed this way, subjects preferred Program D by more
than a three-to-one margin. Although the questions are objectively the same, stating the choice in
specific outcome is achieved. In fact, that possibility is inconsistent with
decisional equity. Instead, the goal is to equip each person with the most
relevant information. The information is designed to provide a clearer
picture of the issue faced as a means of allowing the decision maker to peer
into the future.
In a sense, the cost is the infinitely high cost of a time machine or, less
fancifully, the cost of searching for what the future will be like. Sometimes,
however, the costs can be lowered. For example, a person who has had an
experience will have some advantage over someone who has not. The
student reading about preference reversals,2°  endowment effects,2 ° 1 and
optimism biases202 will be more sensitive to these matters than the student
who has not. And, to go back to the question of desire, the individual who
has read about the topic will be more likely to apply some introspection in
an effort to discover why certain wants develop.
As noted earlier, law is fairly well-equipped to deal with what have been
labeled transaction information imbalances. It is not nearly as well-equipped
to deal with desire and decision-making biases.203 The ideal of actually
"trying on" the future is, of course, impossible to achieve. This does not
mean, however, that contract law does not have a variety of tools that permit
these visits. Certainly, a possibly strained notion of misrepresentation can
address these matters. 204  Contract doctrines addressing capacity20 5 and
unconscionability2 6 also indirectly address these problems. In reality, all of
these doctrines address the overriding transaction cost-the general inability
different terms alters the perception of the issue and may mean different responses. For a more
recent discussion, see Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded
Rationality, 58 AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 697 (2003) [hereinafter Kahneman, Mapping Bounded
Rationality].
200. See description supra note 199.
201. Endowment effects occur when people value the same thing differently depending on
whether they currently possess it. For example, someone might be willing to pay only $20 for a
book in a bookstore, but if that individual currently owns the book, the lowest price taken to sell it
might be $25. See Knetsch & Sinden, supra note 48.
202. Social scientists have discovered that individuals tend to underestimate the possibility of a
negative outcome. See generally W. Kip VISCUSI ET AL., LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND
WORKER RESPONSE TO HAZARD INFORMATION 93-96 (1987); Van den Steen, supra note 52. For a
discussion in the context of the enforcement of liquidated damages clauses, compare Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1743 (2000), with Larry A.
DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS.
L.J. 633 (2001).
203. The most ambitious effort to date to address how law may be applied to offset some of these
biases is Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 14.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 141-165; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 174-77 (1981) (explaining similar notions such as duress and undue influence).
205. More specifically, doctrines dealing with age, cognitive and volitional impairment, and
intoxication come into play here. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12-16 (1981).
206. Id. at § 208.
[Vol. 36: 935, 2009] Happiness, Efficiency, and Decisional Equity
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
to experience or at least comprehend an outcome before actually committing
to it. They do this by looking into the decision-making process and
essentially labeling some types of influence as permissible and some as not.
For the most part the types of influences that are impermissible are those that
make it more difficult-in effect, raise the transaction costs-for one of the
parties to fully understand what it will feel like in the future.
Perhaps the most direct way in which contract law permits one to
examine the future is through the use of cooling-off periods.0 7 A cooling-
off period allows a person to do two things. First, it provides an opportunity
to "try on" the future to see how it feels. For example, Does it really feel
better to "own" the new car or does ownership produce a sense of regret? If
owning the new car causes regret, the implication is that what was valued
was successful completion of the transaction as opposed to the object of the
transaction itself. Unlike an empirical study, however, one cannot "hold
constant" for one factor until the other is isolated. Second, it allows time for
a different perspective to develop with respect to what factors are involved
in the decision.20 8 For example, a reassessment of the transaction may assist
the individual in responding, perhaps more reasonably, to tactics that a
salesperson used to take advantage of typical biases.0 9
The cooling-off period option fits nicely with the general belief among
social scientists that individuals possess two cognitive systems-one
intuitive and the other rational. 210  The intuitive is fast, emotional, and
automatic. Reasoning is slower and takes effort. 21' Here again the analogy
to conventional transaction costs is apt. In that context, it is not simply the
207. See Camerer et al., supra note 2, at 1238-42; Adam J. Hirsch & Gregory Mitchell, Law and
Proximity, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 557, 582; Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card
Use and Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REv. 451, 486 (2008); Erin O'Hara,
Choice of Law for Internet Transactions: The Uneasy Case for Online Consumer Protection, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 1883, 1932-35 (2005); Rachlinski, supra note 19, at 1222; Sunstein & Thaler, supra
note 2, at 1188; Louis E. Wolcher, The Accommodation of Regret in Contract Remedies, 73 IOWA L.
REV. 797, 802 (1988). Possibly the best known cooling-off period is that applied by the Federal
Trade Commission to door-to-door sales. It allows consumers to change their minds within three
days. See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(a) (2008); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND:
THE LAW OF REGRETTED DEciSIONs 24 (1998).
208. Rachlinski, supra note 19, at 1224.
209. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 450-52 (2002).
210. See generally Kahneman, Mapping Bounded Rationality, supra note 199, at 698-701; Keith
E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the
Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 645 (2000).
211. Kahneman, Mapping Bounded Rationality, supra note 199, at 698. There is a similarity here
as well to the distinction between "controlled" and "automatic" responses. See HAIDT, supra note 4,
at 13-17.
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existence of transaction costs that can limit exchange but that a decision
must be made in a timely fashion, thus increasing search and other forms of
transaction costs. In the context of decision errors, the ability to make an
informed choice that is relatively unaffected by decision biases increases
with the time allowed. Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler rightfully point out
that cooling-off periods are more appropriate when individuals are making
decisions with which they have little experience and which are characterized
by high emotions.212 Both of these factors raise the cost of matching
expectations with outcomes.
Thus far the methods discussed all involve ways in which parties are
permitted to feel the outcome of a decision before fully committing to it.
Sunstein, writing with different coauthors, has proposed two other
approaches to the problem. Along with Thaler, Sunstein has proposed
default options.213 This approach would entail the use of automatic adoption
of outcomes that are consistent with what bias-free reasoning would
choose. 214 Decision makers could opt out-of these choices, but the inherent
stickiness of decision making might mean that they choose not to opt out.
More recently, Sunstein and Christine Jolls have described an approach
designed to affect the problem at the core. 5 Instead of shielding people
from the outcomes of decisions, they propose the creation of legal rules that
are directed to debiasing the decisions themselves. 216 In effect, they describe
a variety of ways to lower the costs of connecting to the future. For
example, in response to the tendency of people to discount the possibility of
negative outcomes, they propose the use of specific examples to make those
outcomes more vivid.21 7  They also propose the refraining of dangers in
negative terms in order to offset the optimism bias. 8 These examples are,
in many respects, ways to encourage individuals at the decision-making
stage to actually "experience" the future not simply by supplying more
information but by the careful presentation of particularly relevant
information in a form that is more conducive to avoiding common errors in
selected situations. 219
212. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 2, at 1188.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 14.
216. Id. at 199-202.
217. Id. at 209-15. This proposal is supported by studies indicating that people are more likely to
make accurate estimates when given concrete examples to which they can relate the general
question. Id.
218. For example, warnings related to risks of usage would be framed in terms of likelihood of
harm as opposed to the likelihood of safe use. Id. at 206, 216.
219. Jolls and Sunstein view this approach as less paternalistic than approaches that take
supposedly irrational options away from decision makers. It not clear that choosing the information
and the form in which it is to be delivered can fully escape having a strongly paternalistic influence.
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As such, there is an array of ways to approach decision biases. None is
completely satisfactory, and the ideal of eliminating all decision bias is
likely impossible to achieve. Many operate more or less covertly under
traditional contract doctrines. Their impact with respect to decision biases is
somewhat minimal in that each doctrine-misrepresentation, duress, undue
influence, capacity-requires triggering by identifiable factors.220  These
triggering events do not necessarily coincide with instances of decision bias.
Of these, however, an expansion of misrepresentation is the most
promising.221 For example, a seller who frames a warning or even general
information in a way to take advantage of known decision biases is a little
different from a merchant telling half-truths.222 In both instances there is an
element of predation in the sense that one party raises what might be called
the psychic transaction costs of another. The purpose is to conceal
information by raising the cost of effective reasoning.
Perhaps the most neutral possibility is the expansion of cooling-off
periods.223 In these instances there is no decision about what information is
most important or how it should be presented. Nor are possibly more
paternalistic measures involved.224 As already noted, a more broadly applied
cooling-off period works on the decision bias or psychic transaction cost
problem by allowing individuals to experience the change in position, albeit
lightly, and extend the time for less impulsive thought processes to engage.
Both the traditional contract doctrines and an expansion of those
transactions to which cooling-off periods apply have limits. For example,
the traditional contract doctrines only come into play when one party has
increased the psychic transaction costs above what they otherwise would be.
Both traditional contract doctrines and cooling-off periods seem to apply
See generally Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J. Rizzo, Paternalist Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. &
LIBERTY 411 (2007); Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L.
REv. 1245 (2005). Jolls and Sunstein also describe debiasing techniques that respond to the
endowment effect. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 219-25.
220. Most are obvious, but in the case of duress, the event is an improper threat. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (1981).
221. For a discussion of Federal Trade Commission regulations that have the same goal, see Jolls
& Sunstein, supra note 14, at 215-17.
222. For evidence that marketers are fully aware of decision biases, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas
A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 630, 637 (1999), and Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1420, 1425-27 (1999).
223. The neutrality suggested here goes to the content of the final decision. Colin Camerer and
his coauthors rightfully point out that the general policy is paternalistic and not cost-free. See
Camerer et. al., supra note 2, at 1239-40.
224. One possibility-mandatory cooling-off periods-would have a more paternalistic flavor.
most easily to agreements and to decisions that can be easily "undone."
Even if "agreement" can be applied very broadly,225 many critical life
decisions-families, school choice, medical care, etc.-do not fall into the
"undoable" category.
The implications of proposals that address the choices available or the
form in which information is supplied through direct regulation are more
nuanced and perhaps hold greater promise than traditional methods, but they
too have limitations. For example, not all people experience the same biases
to the same degree.226 Nor are they present at the same level in all
transactions. Thus, a regulatory approach runs the risk of excessive
complication and paternalistic tendencies. As an example of this, consider
the possibility of a warning label designed to overcome an optimism bias.
One warning on a package of cigarettes may read "Cigarette smoking may
be hazardous to your health." If the optimism bias is in play, the reader is
inclined to assume that if anyone's health is affected it will be someone
else's. Or the warning label may read "Cigarette smoking causes cancer"
and include a photo of a decaying lung.227 The effect may be to make the
decision to smoke or not to smoke more "rational" by decreasing the
likelihood that the optimism bias will influence the decision. The
information, however, is unlikely to affect only the decision. As such, like
the impossibility of "unringing the bell," the person who chooses to smoke,
unfettered by a decision bias, may turn out to enjoy it less because of the
images found on the package. It may be impossible in many instances to
untangle the benefits of addressing decision biases from the costs imposed
on those who then rationally choose to pursue the activity.228 Nevertheless,
in the interests of decisional equity, there may be many relatively
inexpensive measures that do not involve a refined analysis.
225. See Camerer et al., supra note 2, at 1240 (noting that decisions like marriage and divorce
could be susceptible to treatment by cooling-off periods).
226. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and
Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207 (2006); Mitchell, supra note 19, at 69. One risk, as noted by
Jolls and Sunstein, is the possibility that individuals who are already sensitive to risks will overreact.
Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 230.
227. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 214-15.
228. Colin Camerer and his coauthors propose asymmetric paternalism as a response to decision
bias. See Camerer et al., supra note 2, at 1219. Under this approach, techniques to respond to biases
would be implemented as long as the benefits to "boundedly rational" decision makers offset the
costs to rational decision makers. Id. The approach recognizes that individuals may be affected in
different degrees by cognitive biases. Whether the consumption effect identified here is anticipated
by their analysis is not clear.
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3. The Social Ideal
In addition to the biases discussed above, information and how it is
processed can be a function of perceptions of fairness and adaptations to
unfairness that may be status-based. To illustrate how this works, consider
this example of actual behavior. Two professors are hired to teach at a law
school. At the time of accepting the position, neither thinks to negotiate
about moving expenses. Both are destined to incur the same relocation
expenses. Late in the summer before beginning their new duties, each
receives a letter from the Dean indicating that the school will pay moving
expenses up to $4,000. One faculty member from a relatively privileged
background is incensed and writes to complain that $4,000 is not enough.
The second faculty member, from a working-class background, is simply
happy to hear the unexpected good news. 29
In this instance, the faculty member from the relatively privileged
background feels deprived. More specifically, he feels deprived relative to a
reference group. The other faculty member has no complaints. Her social
context does not include family members who have reached a professional
status that is consistent with having moving expenses paid for. This is, in
fact, what relative deprivation theory 30 suggests: individuals assess fairness
by comparing their outcomes to the outcomes for other members of a
specific reference group. In the example, one law professor did not feel
"deprived" because moving expenses are for "other people." Individuals
who experience a sense of relative deprivation 23' believe they are entitled to
more.232 Those who lack it are likely to be satisfied with less. 3 At the most
basic level the actors are responding to different information in the form of
socialization about their status, whether legitimate or not. It is hard to
square a class-based influence with decisional equity.
229. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 79, at 217; Sara J. Solnick & David Hemenway, Is More Always
Better?: A Survey on Positional Concerns, 37 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373 (1998).
230. The term "relative deprivation" is used in a number of interrelated ways. First it may simply
refer to the fact that some citizens have less than others mainly with respect to public services or
necessities. They are, in effect, "relatively deprived." From a more sociological perspective, the
term is used to describe situations in which there is a sense of being relatively deprived. Here, it
means that people believe they deserve better. Lacking a sense of relative deprivation suggests
people are satisfied with their status at work or in life generally. Finally, one may be sensitive to
relative deprivation but not have a sense of relative deprivation.
231. In other words, the person feels relatively deprived in a subjective sense.
232. See J. Stacy Adams & Sara Freeman, Equity Theory Revisited: Comments and an Annotated
Bibliography, in 9 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 43 (Leonard Berkowitz &
Elaine Walster eds., 1976).
233. See generally Harrison, supra note 82, at 478.
In many respects, the socialization bias may be more important than the
decision-making biases discussed above. The effects may be to retard
upward mobility, perpetuate class stratification, and generate social and
individual unrest. 234 Interestingly, with very small exception,2 35 the scholars
who have plowed the field of cognitive distortions and biases over the past
thirty years have paid little attention to the impact of relative deprivation.
Part of the reason may be that a great deal of those commenting on the
former field ultimately seem concerned with efficiency goals. The economic
importance of relative deprivation and related ideas like equity theory2 36 is
seen as limited to distributive outcomes. In fact, this is not the case. To the
extent a sense of relative deprivation is consistent with disutility, even the
most efficiency-minded economist should regard it as something to address
for efficiency purposes.237
Relative deprivation as a source of disutility leaves the efficiency-
conscious person with two questions: What is the least expensive way to
extinguish the disutility? Is the cost greater or less than the benefit? For
example, it might be efficient to decrease the sense of relative deprivation by
reinforcing adaptive tendencies that remove the psychic discomfort. Thus,
individuals may begin to accept personal responsibility for things over
which they have no control, give in to the feeling that whatever class
stratification exists is, in fact, justified, or find other ways to adapt in order
to avoid the discomfort or dissonance of feeling deprived.238 Most important
is the tendency for people to pick as a reference group those who are similar
and then conclude that they are not deprived relative to that group.
239
Finally, they may create an imaginary reality in which their position is
234. There is a distinction between egoistic relative deprivation and fraternal deprivations. As the
labels suggest, in the former case a person may examine the group he views himself as part of and
feel deprived relative to that group. In the case of fraternal deprivation, the view is that the group is
not properly placed. See W.G. RUNCIMAN, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY
OF ATTITUDES TO SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY ENGLAND 31-35 (1966); Francine
Tougas & Ann M. Beaton, Personal and Group Relative Deprivation, in RELATIVE DEPRIVATION:
SPECIFICATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND INTEGRATION 119 (lain Walker & Heather J. Smith eds.,
2002).
235. See Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 323 (2001).
236. See Adams & Freeman, supra note 232, at 43.
237. See Robert H. Frank, The Frame of Reference as a Public Good, 107 ECON. J. 1832 (1997).
238. See ELSTER, supra note 82, at 109-33. George C. Homans puts it this way: "[W]hat people
say ought to be is determined in the long run... by what they find in fact to be the case." GEORGE
C. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS 250 (rev. ed. 1974).
239. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and
Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1254-55 (2000)
(discussing how this frame of reference may evolve); see also Mary Jo Wiggins, Race, Class, and
Suburbia: The Modern Black Suburb as a 'Race Making Situation,' 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749,
793-800 (2002).
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similar to others.240 In effect, from a purely economic perspective, it may be
efficient to devote public resources to legitimizing the status quo, whatever
that happens to be.24'
Such an approach is not consistent with decisional equity. Decisional
equity, at the most basic level, calls for accurate perception of information of
all kinds, including one's own value relative to all others. The adaptations
people make to what would be perceived as inequities filter this information.
The question for decisional equity is how to react to these filters. One
approach is to decrease the need for the filters. Another is to decrease their
effectiveness.
a. Decreasing the Need for Filters
In order to understand how these two approaches work, think of a small
town in which there is one employer-a textile factory. The workers earn an
average of $7.00 per hour and live on one side of town. Generally their jobs
are the same ones their parents held. Management makes significantly more
and lives on the other side of town. There is little upward mobility, and if
asked, the workers might indicate that it is a matter of supply and demand
242
and the fact that they have only limited skills. They may feel little
resentment because they have adapted in order to avoid the dissonance
associated with feeling unfairly paid. Needless to say, the adaptation would
be unnecessary if the disparity between rich and poor in the town were
less. 243 By removing the need for the adaptations that filter out the feelings
of injustice, decisions are less likely to be influenced by these factors. More
directly, people are more likely to stop accepting what is and think in terms
of what can be if they view the range of realistic expectations as being
broader.
The idea of creating a context in which perceptions of injustice would
be less is a broad one and not original. Economist Robert H. Frank, starting
from the proposition that subjective well-being is largely a relative matter,
240. This follows from the tendency to overestimate the extent to which their views are similar to
those of others in order to feel good about those views. For a more complete discussion and case
studies, see George R. Goethals, Fabricating and Ignoring Social Reality: Self-Serving Estimates of
Consensus, in 4 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 79, at 135.
241. It seems clear that the status quo does have value. See John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System
Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status
Quo, 25 POL. PSY. 881 (2004).
242. See Martin, supra note 79.
243. See generally William H. Panning, supra note 84.
has proposed taxing consumption.24 Frank's proposal is based on the
utility-increasing impact of lower levels of disparity.245 In the context of
decisional equity the reasoning is different. The goal is to reduce the need
for adaptation that skews the perceptions of justice.
b. Decreasing the Effectiveness of Filters
If psychological filters are adapted to protect individuals from
experiencing a sense of relative deprivation, it may seem counterproductive
to propose decreasing their effectiveness. The problem is that the filters
avoid the disutility by distorting reality. Removing them is likely to make
people feel worse off and agitated in the short run and even in the long run if
the factors creating the sense of deprivation are permanent.246 Too much
concern about this, however, means falling into the trap of putting imprecise
outcome goals ahead of process. Removing the filters is comparable to
providing accurate information that creates the sense of deprivation. An
important distinction is, however, warranted here. When an individual
instinctively responds only to bare outside data, it is probably more accurate
to say that the individual is already sensitive to relative deprivation but has
not sensed relative deprivation until hearing the news. Thus, a worker may
become unhappy upon hearing another worker doing the same job is paid
more or that someone paid a lower price for the same car. This
dissatisfaction may then lead to action. More difficult is the case of an
individual who has adapted to such an extent that the individual is not
sensitive to relative deprivation. In this case, the different wage or price
paid for the car is attributed to factors that make them seem fair.
In the first case, the problem is relatively simple. The information itself
creates the decisional equity. In the second case, something more is
required. For example, in the instance of the textile workers described
above, to be effective the information needs a contextual element. The news
may come in the form of finding out that unionized workers doing the same
work elsewhere are paid significantly more. Thus, even if they have chosen
only workers with the same level of skill as the relevant reference group, it
will be hard to filter out completely the question of why they should earn
any less. In days when organized labor was more active, this news might
244. See FRANK, supra note 4, at 246-50. Frank views the disutility from economic disparities as
a type of externality. Id. at 122-23. In a sense, what has been described here are filters designed to
decrease the impact of the externality. See also Michael J. Boskin & Eytan Sheshinski, Optimal
Redistributive Taxation When Individual Welfare Depends Upon Relative Income, 92 Q. J. ECON.
589 (1978).
245. See FRANK, supra note 4, at 248-50.
246. A sense of relative deprivation has been associated with higher levels of crime. See, e.g.,
Judith R. Blau & Peter M. Blau, The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and Violent Crime,
47 AM. Soc. REV. 114, 122 (1982).
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come from a union organizer. The information must make prior adaptations
relatively ineffective in order to create the sense of relative deprivation that
leads to decisions made with clarity.
To be sure, the information is double-edged. Efforts may both elevate
individuals' sense of worth and create dissonance because they feel
deserving of more than they have. This dissonance may result in more
adaptive behavior or action to either correct or protest against the
injustice. 47 Most important for decisional equity, the perception of injustice
may mean that the decision that follows is made with greater information
than existed when the subject had effective filters.
In the harder case of the person who is insensitive to relative
deprivation, there may be a need for some kind of catalyst. In these cases,
the most likely source of enlightenment and action is through fraternal
relative deprivation. 24  This means essentially raising the consciousness of
an entire class of people to the possibility of a shared unfairness. In effect,
each person remains the same within the relevant group, but the group itself
develops norms that are adopted by all.249 Possibly the best examples of this
are the American experience with respect to race25 ° and other social
movements.
Of the three ideals incorporated into decisional equity, the possibility of
the disadvantaged achieving the ability to make decisions beyond the cloud
of class-based preferences seems the most remote with respect to changes
law can bring about. Reducing differences with a policy of taxing
consumption as proposed by Professor Frank seems unrealistic. Similarly,
courts seem generally unresponsive to social class-based claims that might
247. See Robert MacCulloch, Income Inequality and the Taste for Revolution, 48 J.L. & ECON. 93
(2005); Steven Stack, Income Inequality and Property Crime: A Cross-National Analysis of Relative
Deprivation Theory, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 229 (1984); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy
and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and
Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 789 (1994).
248. See supra note 234.
249. See generally Joanne Martin & Alan Murray, Catalysts for Collective Violence: The
Importance of a Psychological Approach, in THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 95 (Robert Folger ed., 1984);
Stephen C. Wright & Linda R. Tropp, Collective Action in Response to Disadvantage: Intergroup
Perceptions, Social Identification, and Social Change, in RELATIVE DEPRIVATION: SPECIFICATION,
DEVELOPMENT, AND INTEGRATION, supra note 234, at 200.
250. See Lise Dup6 & Serge Guimond, Relative Deprivation and Social Protest: The Personal-
Group Issue, in 4 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 79, at 210. It seems clear that the church has played an important role in this
development. See Rosemary D'Apolito, The Activist Role of the Black Church, 31 J. BLACK STUD.
96 (2000). Recent news events involving Reverend Dr. Jeremiah A. Wright, Jr. also provide insight
into the role of some Black churches. See, e.g., Jeff Zeleny & Adam Nagourney, An Angry Obama
Renounces Ties to His Ex-Pastor, N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 2008, at Al.
have the impact of affirming a sense of relative deprivation.25' Individuals
may change from time to time and develop a legitimate sense of relative
deprivation, but as already noted, it is doubtful that anything less than a
class-wide phenomenon would make a substantial difference.
Perhaps the most difficult problem is deciding which groups are entitled
to feel relatively deprived. Clearly middle-class people and the wealthy
could reach a conclusion through the development of a sense of relative
deprivation that they are entitled to more. In the example set out at the
beginning of this section, the upper-class law professor complained of the
moving expense allocation because he felt deprived relative to the group of
which he was a part. In addition, some may feel relatively deprived by
looking at those who have less and concluding that the difference should be
greater. The problem is identifying and isolating those groups who make
decisions on the basis of lowered expectations that are adaptations to class.
Whether there is any legal mechanism for achieving this is doubtful.
VI. SUMMARY
The connection between efficiency and well-being has been undergoing
scrutiny for a number of years. Recent emphasis on direct measures of
happiness is an improvement but also imperfect. Questions arise with
respect to whether well-being is a subjective or objective notion and, if
subjective, When does the feeling of happiness count? Given the
indeterminacy of all outcome measures, this Article suggests changing the
emphasis to process-specifically to the decision-making process.
The ideal of decisional equity requires addressing three areas-
information imbalances, psychic biases, and adaptations to social conditions.
All of these affect the decision-making process to one degree or another
creating a separation between what might be called true preferences and
expected outcomes. The capacity of legal institutions to respond to these
three areas in hopes of achieving ideal conditions is likely to be greatest in
the case of information problems and very limited in the case of social
adaptations. A fourth area of concern has not been addressed--differences
in native intellect. To be sure, these differences also have an impact on
decision making. Whether there should be a legal response to these
differences is another question deserving of close examination.25
251. To some extent contract has the tools to make individualized changes. See Harrison, supra
note 82, at 489-500. Note that class plays a role in judicial decision making. See Miriam A. Cherry,
Exploring (Social) Class in the Classroom: The Case of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L. REV.
235,237-39 (2008).
252. This is not to suggest the issue has not been addressed. See, e.g., Erik J.S. Plug et al., If We
Knew Ability, How Would We Tax Individuals?, 72 J. PuB. ECON. 183 (1999); Lawrence Zelenak,
Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145 (2000). The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act,
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which recently became law, prohibits discrimination by health insurers on the basis of genetic
information. See Pub. L. No. 110-233, §§ 101-06, 122 Stat 881 (2008). The outcome is a required
cross-subsidization of high-risk insureds by low-risk insureds. This concept is difficult to
distinguish from a policy of what might be called genetic equity in decision making.
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